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Arizona State University, in order to become more committed to the Arizona community 
and to society as a whole, is setting a new standard for research universities through the 
model of the New American University. As a New American University, ASU is 
measured not by who we exclude, but by who we include; we pursue research that 
considers the public good; and we assume major responsibility for the economic, social, 
and cultural vitality of our community.  Social embeddedness is core to the development 
of ASU as the New American University. Social embeddedness is a university-wide, 
interactive, and mutually-supportive partnership with the communities of Arizona. 
 
Toward the goal of social embeddedness, Arizona State University established the Center 
for Violence Prevention and Community Safety in July 2005 to respond to the growing 
need of Arizona’s communities to improve the public’s safety and well being.   The 
Center for Violence Prevention and Community Safety is a research unit within the 
College of Human Services at Arizona State University.  The Center’s mission is to 
generate, share, and apply quality research and knowledge to create “best practice” 
standards.  The center specifically evaluates policies and programs, analyzes and 
evaluates patterns and causes of violence, develops strategies and programs, develops a 
clearinghouse of research reports and “best practice” models, educates, trains and 
provides technical assistance, and facilitates the development of and construction of 
databases.  For more information about the Center for Violence Prevention and 
Community Safety please contact us using the information provided below. 
 
Mailing Address 
Center for Violence Prevention and Community Safety 
Arizona State University  
P.O. Box 37100  
Mail Code 3250 
Phoenix, Arizona, 85069-7100 
 
Street Address 
Center for Violence Prevention and Community Safety 
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Executive Summary 
 
Introduction and Background 
This report assesses the needs of the West Valley Information Sharing Enterprise 
(WISE), a group of 10 law enforcement agencies within Maricopa County, Arizona, that 
is attempting to build an infrastructure for sharing information and data. These agencies 
share a common vision for increased efficiencies and performance through the sharing of 
accurate and reliable information. In November 2005, the Center for Violence Prevention 
and Community Safety at Arizona State University was contracted to conduct a needs 
assessment for implementing WISE. This report is one of several products that will be 
provided by the Center and that are intended to begin a dialogue for creating a strategic 
plan for building the required infrastructure for information sharing. This assessment 
serves as a guide for the WISE Committee to move forward in developing that strategic 
plan.  
 
The needs assessment has four objectives that will affect West Valley police agencies: 
 
1. Define the current technological environment.  
2. Define how technology is used or consumed.  
3. Identify current and future data-sharing needs.  
4. Determine the obstacles that may interfere with regional information sharing.  
 
Methods 
To accomplish these objectives, we interviewed personnel from 10 participating West 
Valley law enforcement agencies and two comparison agencies, Phoenix and Chandler 
police departments, that are not part of the West Valley. The 10 West Valley agencies 
included Avondale, Buckeye, El Mirage, Glendale, Goodyear, Peoria, Surprise, Tolleson, 
Wickenburg, and Youngtown. We also examined more than 100 Web sites to obtain a 
picture of how data are used and presented to the public in the state of Arizona and 
nationally. 
 
We interviewed 239 sworn personnel and civilians from the 12 police agencies. They 
represented six stakeholder groups: patrol, investigations, crime analysts, CAD/RMS 
managers, homeland security, and command personnel. Stakeholder interview protocols 
contained 10 to 16 questions. Although a predetermined list of questions was used to 
guide discussions, participants were afforded significant range to discuss topics and 
issues as they arose.  
 
Findings 
Objective 1:  Define the current technological environment.  
• Technological resources are severely limited in some agencies, but in others the 
potential for growth mirrors future population increases. 
• The technological infrastructure (hardware and software) for information sharing 
varies across the West Valley. Wickenburg, for example, had no CAD, RMS, or 
MDCs in patrol cars. At the other end of the spectrum is Glendale which had 
CAD, RMS, MDCs, GIS, an interactive Web site, and a crime analyst.  
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Objective 2:  Define how technology is used or consumed.  
• Some West Valley agencies are or will soon be able to share information through 
their current systems. For example, El Mirage currently supports Youngtown 
through its CAD system. Four agencies, Avondale, Buckeye, Surprise, and 
Tolleson, are on the cusp of sharing information because they all use the Spillman 
system. Glendale is able to obtain information from Phoenix through PACE, and 
Peoria will soon be able to share information with Phoenix through COPLINK.  
• Eight of the 10 West Valley agencies have recently acquired or updated their 
CAD/RMS systems. Many still are in the process of converting data and bringing 
their systems up to full operational capacity. Glendale plans to upgrade its 
CAD/RMS over the next 5 years.  
• No police department in the West Valley has an existing system readily capable 
of collecting, evaluating, analyzing, and distributing information and knowledge 
in an efficient and user-friendly manner to all of the involved agencies. 
 
Identified Technology Needs 
 
• Patrol officers in El Mirage, Youngtown, and presumably Wickenburg expressed 
a need for MDCs in their cars, and investigators throughout the West Valley 
expressed a need for MDCs in their vehicles. 
• Youngtown and Wickenburg sought basic technology (e.g., CAD, RMS) for their 
agencies. 
• Half of the chiefs and commanders sought mapping capabilities for their agencies.  
 
Objective 3:  Identify current and future data-sharing needs.  
• Patrol officers and investigators want direct access to data about persons, 
including an individual’s prior contact with police, criminal history, Field 
Interview card data, photograph, aliases, associates, addresses, and outstanding 
warrants.  
• Patrol officers want access to Attempt to Locate suspect and vehicle information 
and knowledge about ongoing investigations.  
• Investigators want information derived from Field Interview cards, access to 
crime trend data from neighboring jurisdictions, and access to internal and 
interagency RMS data in the field. 
• Patrol officers and investigators both seek additional information from crime 
analysts including mapping, crime trends, hot spots, and predictive information. 
• Chiefs and commanders support their officers’ requests for modus operandi (MO) 
information and person data. 
• Crime analysts indicated that person data, MO information, and address-level data 
are most needed.  
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Objective 4:  Determine the obstacles that may interfere with regional information 
sharing. 
• Current MO data was found to be unreliable and not valid in most of the study 
agencies. 
• At least half of the agencies do not have the capacity to engage in place-based 
(address-level) analysis. 
• For some agencies, the cost of implementing an information-sharing system could 
be a deterrent to participating fully in WISE . 
• Administrative and management problems with the development of a regional 
data-sharing initiative could cause problems with project implementation.  
• Issues pertaining to data management, data security, data ownership, quality 
control, system maintenance, standardization of terminology, and training 
requirements all need to be discussed in order not to derail the sharing of 
information. 
• Turf battles among all personnel levels could hinder data sharing. 
• Some West Valley police agencies have already committed to costly information 
systems; they may not want to spend additional monies on yet another 
information system. 
 
Recommendations 
Based on this assessment, we recommend the following steps: 
 
1. Create a governance structure to assure the success of the project. This should 
include representation and leadership from the West Valley Chiefs of Police. We 
recommend that the committee serve as a subcommittee for the Far West Valley 
Chiefs Association to provide oversight and guidance for the WISE effort.  
 
2. The subcommittee from the West Valley Chiefs Association should select a 
project manager for the WISE initiative. It is recommended that this person be 
independent of West Valley police agencies so that he or she can offer 
independent and unbiased advice and direction. The project manager should be 
responsible for guiding the strategic planning process, identifying money to 
implement the WISE project, serving as liaison between the West Valley Chiefs 
of Police and the WISE subcommittee, and for implementing the project. 
 
3. Create a team or subcommittee from within WISE to initiate a strategic planning 
process that will lead to the implementation of a West Valley-wide system and 
intelligence-led policing efforts. This team would develop a strategic plan, based 
upon the needs assessment, to bring to the WISE group for feedback and 
approval. As noted previously, the strategic plan should have as a primary focus 
the sharing of person-level data.  
 
4. A written statement about the West Valley effort thus far to create an information-
sharing initiative should be distributed to the public through local newspapers and 
television stations. This not only will foster legitimacy for the West Valley 
agencies and their chiefs, but it will convey information to other Maricopa County 
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law enforcement agencies about the growing organizational capacity and strength 
of the West Valley. 
 
5. Create an external advisory board. The board should be comprised of individuals 
who have played a primary role in the creation of data-sharing projects within 
their jurisdictions. This group will be able to provide WISE with valuable 
experiential advice on how to proceed and how to address obstacles.  
 
Recommended Next Steps 
• Hire a project manager who is independent of West Valley police agencies. 
• Develop a preliminary strategic plan for implementing the WISE project. 
o Assign individuals from the WISE committee to a subcommittee for 
accomplishing this task. 
• Determine the timeline for the above two action steps. 
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Introduction 
 
Since 9/11, building the necessary infrastructure for law enforcement information sharing 
has been an increasing priority. Such an infrastructure must include not only the 
technological means for exchanging information, but the business processes and 
communication associated with sharing information and working together. The challenge 
of sharing information across jurisdictional boundaries is a formidable one. With these 
challenges, however, come significant opportunities to leverage resources and to build 
strategies and partnerships for fighting crime and preventing terrorist activities. 
 
The development of the Global Justice XML Data Model (GJXDM) has served as a 
catalyst for data integration efforts throughout the country. The standards brought forth 
through GJXDM have increased the opportunities for data sharing in a consistent format 
with partners across the criminal justice field. The rapid increase in the number of data-
sharing initiatives in Arizona and across the country is notable.  
 
Unfortunately, integration and information-sharing projects have been found to be 
associated with high failure rates and deemed to be high-risk ventures. Given the history 
of these types of projects, it is important to take advantage of lessons learned. One of the 
lessons learned is that the needs assessment has a critical role in the development of a 
strategic plan for implementing a successful information-sharing initiative. It is also 
important to acknowledge the need for long-term commitment from chiefs and upper-
level management to such a project.  
 
Most experts agree that the greatest population growth in Maricopa County will occur in 
the West Valley (MAG, 2006). This expansion will place a substantial burden upon all 
service agencies in that region. Without question, the information infrastructure 
supporting law enforcement in the West Valley will be substantially affected by the 
anticipated growth. Through extensive interviews with sworn and civilian personnel, an 
examination of their data systems, and a review of Web sites, we assessed the state of 
information sharing in the West Valley. The importance of a comprehensive strategy 
based upon a systematic needs assessment is the basis for this report. 
 
This report assesses the needs of the West Valley Information Sharing Enterprise 
(WISE), a group of 10 law enforcement agencies within Maricopa County, Arizona, that 
is attempting to build an infrastructure to share information and data. These agencies 
share a common vision for increased efficiency and performance through the sharing of 
accurate and reliable information. Local law enforcement agencies often possess vital 
information that is not shared with their law enforcement partners (SEARCH, 2005). 
Increased information sharing provides a clear benefit to all levels of law enforcement. 
 
The report is divided into 11 sections. First, in the Background Section, we briefly 
discuss information technologies and data sharing, and what it takes to succeed with 
projects of this nature. Then we examine components of intelligence-led policing, a 
national trend that incorporates information, analysis, intelligence, and tenets of problem 
solving and community policing. Second, we describe our study, including the setting 
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and our research methods. Sections III through VIII describe our findings with respect to 
six stakeholder groups: patrol, investigations, crime analysts, CAD/RMS managers, 
homeland security, and command personnel. Section IX reports on our examination of 
Web sites across the country. Sections X and XI provide conclusions and 
recommendations, respectively.  
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Section I:  Background 
 
During the past decade, the advancement of information technologies has been 
phenomenal. Significant progress has been made in areas of data storage, Internet access, 
and data security. More recently, progress has been made in standardizing data elements 
and in the willingness of agencies to share information beyond their present political 
comfort zones. Currently, numerous data-integration and information-sharing projects are 
occurring at national and local levels of government.1 This provides both a challenge and 
an opportunity for new data-integration and information-sharing projects.  
 
Information-sharing initiatives are generally complex, which increases the risk of failure 
and the likelihood of wasted resources. Further, the complexity of data-integration and 
information-sharing issues can be a deterrent for moving forward. Often the challenge is 
deciding which data-integration or information-sharing projects are the best fit for an 
agency or region. Unfortunately, there are no perfect solutions. Rather, there are 
strategies and processes by which agencies can reduce their risk and increase their 
certainty of achieving specific value-added benefits. 
 
The commitment of decision makers while developing both partnerships and long-term 
solutions is critical to the success of information-sharing projects. The organizational 
changes necessary for such a paradigm shift to occur must come from the highest 
organizational levels. A strong commitment among agency management and leaders to a 
long-term strategy for information sharing and the building of partnerships will 
contribute greatly to the project’s likelihood of success. 
 
Experts in the field of data integration also indicate that trust and willingness to share 
information are critical to information sharing within the law enforcement domain. 
Researchers from COPLINK point out that agencies must see an immediate gain or 
benefit in order to be motivated to share knowledge and information. The need for an 
immediate or short-term value-added for an agency is an important prerequisite for 
creating a project design directed toward building an information-sharing and 
collaboration infrastructure (Chau, 2001). 
 
Information-sharing initiatives are most likely to succeed when they are based on a 
comprehensive and systematic needs assessment of organizational, system, and technical 
requirements (BJA, 2006). The assessment provides a means for beginning the dialogue 
about an initial course of action and for building consensus and an understanding of the 
complexities involved in completing a regional information-sharing initiative. The 
importance of this issue is underscored by recent findings presented at the 2006 
SEARCH Symposium on Justice and Public Safety Information Sharing. There, it was 
reported that: 
 
• Over half of all data-sharing projects will cost 189% of original estimates. 
                                                 
1 According to SEARCH, Inc., every state is attempting to integrate data systems. In addition, there are 27 
local and regional data sharing projects underway. See www.search.org for more details. 
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• Large organizations end up with only 42% of the features and functions that they 
originally desired in their products. 
• Thirty-one percent of data-sharing projects are canceled before completion. 
• Only 16% of information-sharing projects are completed on time and within 
budget (Harris, 2006). 
 
Part of the complexity of information-sharing initiatives lies in defining information 
sharing within a law enforcement context. Information sharing can occur within a single 
law enforcement agency and across multiple jurisdictions. There are also increasing 
mandates for sharing information at the state and local levels of government, as well as 
across diverse agencies within the criminal justice system. During the past decade, we 
have seen an increase in requirements for sharing information with non-criminal justice 
government agencies, as well as with the public at large. Obviously, there are multiple 
definitions needed for information sharing, each resulting in different strategies for data 
inclusion and data security.  
 
We have defined information sharing as “an exchange of information that provides value 
to law enforcement agencies, both at the operations and the management levels of the 
organization.” The advent of computer technology has increased the opportunities for 
sharing information that increases productivity for law enforcement operations and 
management activities.  
 
Evidence can be found regarding the benefits of increased access to information at both 
the operations and the management levels of law enforcement. For example, Zaworski 
(2005) examined the impact of the Automated Regional Justice Information System 
(ARJIS) on the performance of officers and investigators in the San Diego Sheriff’s 
Department. The findings indicated that information-sharing technology in general 
increases effectiveness and job performance. More specifically, Zaworski reported, 
information-sharing technology increased arrests for patrol officers and improved case 
clearance rates for detectives. The report indicated that with the technology, officers were 
more satisfied with the data available to help them perform their jobs, and they believed 
that officer safety was enhanced by increased officer knowledge in the field. 
 
Zaworski’s findings are not unique. Research repeatedly has found that the role of 
information within the job functions of patrol and investigations has changed remarkably 
over the past decade. Both patrol officers and detectives have been found to rely upon 
computer systems and information-sharing technology in performing their duties. “Police 
detectives and patrol officers are both faced with high degrees of uncertainty and 
voluminous amounts of data to analyze. This makes the use of computers critical to 
improving field officer productivity” (Ioimo, 2000, p. 127).  
 
Intelligence-Led Policing 
 
The phenomenon of information sharing across jurisdictions has not gone unnoticed by 
those concerned with the bigger picture of terrorism prevention, problem-oriented 
policing, and community policing – three major themes in law enforcement. One national 
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trend is the movement toward intelligence-led policing. The idea of intelligence-led 
policing2 involves “a collaborative enterprise based on improved intelligence operations 
and community-oriented policing and problem solving” (Peterson, 2005). At the core of 
intelligence-led policing is the notion that information sharing must become policy, not 
just informal practice, and that intelligence is contingent upon the quality analysis of 
data. In its simplest form, intelligence means information plus analysis (Peterson, 
2005:3). Intelligence is the product of data that are collected, evaluated, and analyzed. 
Ideally, with intelligence-led policing, chiefs, commanders, and supervisors are provided 
facts, alternatives, and intelligence before they choose a course of action.  
 
Thus, intelligence becomes critical for decision making, planning, strategic thinking, and 
crime prevention. It not only applies to homeland security, but to policing in general. The 
key is whether an agency is aware of intelligence as a concept – whether it is involved in 
collecting information and engaged in some form of analysis, creating a “culture of 
knowledge and intelligence” (Peterson, 2005: 13). Intelligence information is critical to 
effective decision making; however, it is often not available or incomplete at either the 
patrol or command levels of an organization. “In many law enforcement agencies, 
planning is performed without an understanding of the crime problems facing the 
jurisdiction and without sufficient operational input” (BJA, 2005). For this reason, the 
WISE initiative has solicited feedback from all levels of operations as the foundation of 
developing a strategic plan.  
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Intelligence-led policing originated in Great Britain through the Kent Policing Model, which de-
emphasized responding to service calls, instead calling for intelligence units to focus on property crime and 
other serious criminal behavior. See Peterson, 2005, p. 9, for more details. 
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Section II:  The Present Study 
 
In November 2005, ASU’s Center for Violence Prevention and Community Safety was 
contracted to conduct a needs assessment for the implementation of the West Valley 
Information Sharing Enterprise (WISE). This report is one of several products that will be 
provided by the Center,  and that are intended to begin a dialogue for creating a strategic 
plan. This assessment is intended to serve as a guide for the WISE Committee as it 
develops a strategic plan for the initial steps toward building an infrastructure that will 
improve information sharing for West Valley law enforcement agencies. 
 
The needs assessment had four major objectives. The first was to define the current 
technological environment within West Valley police agencies. Specifically, we were 
interested in identifying the current technology used to collect, maintain, and disseminate 
information for the purpose of assessing the technological infrastructure baseline within 
the West Valley. The second objective of the needs assessment was to define how 
technology is used or consumed within West Valley police agencies. This will help with 
understanding how information is used to accomplish particular goals and with 
identifying the goals and needs of police agencies. The third objective of the needs 
assessment was to identify current and future data-sharing needs of West Valley police 
agencies. In particular, we were interested in locating information gaps and determining 
what information agencies need to achieve their goals. The last objective of the needs 
assessment was to determine the obstacles to regional information sharing among West 
Valley police agencies so that these might be addressed. 
 
To accomplish the above objectives, feedback was solicited from 10 participating West 
Valley law enforcement agencies and Phoenix and Chandler police departments, two 
comparison agencies not part of the West Valley. The 10 West Valley agencies included 
Avondale, Buckeye, El Mirage, Glendale, Goodyear, Peoria, Surprise, Tolleson, 
Wickenburg, and Youngtown. We also examined more than 100 Web sites to obtain a 
picture of how data are used and presented in the state of Arizona and nationally. The 
next section describes our research setting and methods used for the present study.  
 
Setting and Methods 
 
This section describes the methodological strategies used as part of our needs assessment 
on data sharing among West Valley agencies. In particular, we describe the settings in 
which the study took place, explain the characteristics of the police departments 
examined, and discuss the approaches used to collect data. 
 
Table 1 shows the general characteristics of the study sites. The geographic size of the 
jurisdictions varied substantially. For example, although four of the police departments 
are responsible for geographic areas of less than 15 square miles, two of the police 
departments are responsible for geographic areas that are more than 175 square miles in 
size. Likewise, police agencies varied substantially in their numbers of authorized 
employees, ranging from 15 employees in the Youngtown Police Department to 523 in 
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the Glendale Police Department.3  
 
An examination of calls for service shows that West Valley police department workloads 
also vary by agency. For instance, Glendale Police Department handles more than 
153,000 calls for service per year, followed by Peoria (107,646) and Avondale (75,000), 
whereas El Mirage and Youngtown police departments handled only 27,000 and 5,305 
calls for service respectively. Similarly, study sites varied on the amount of crime taking 
place within their communities. For example, El Mirage, Glendale, and Youngtown 
report substantially more violent crime than Surprise, Goodyear, and Wickenburg, and 
Tolleson and Buckeye report comparatively high rates of property crime compared with 
cities such as Surprise and Peoria. 
 
Table 1. Study Site Characteristics  
Agency Personnel2
UCR Data 4 
Crimes per 1,000 
pop. Agency 
City Sq 
Miles1
Sworn Civilian 
Estimated 
Calls for 
Service 3 Violent Property 
  
AVONDALE+ 42.92 91 49 52,410 -- -- 
BUCKEYE 218.57 31 10 -- 2.98 74.99 
EL MIRAGE 11.2 43 8 27,000 7.79 45.90 
GLENDALE+ 56.49 384 139 153,131 5.97 57.70 
GOODYEAR+ 117.10 68 22 31,839 2.00 47.49 
PEORIA+ 175.94 170 80 107,646 2.31 42.85 
SURPRISE+ 74.34 105 37 66,543 1.53 32.19 
TOLLESON+ 5.11 26 10 10,800 4.87 124.57 
WICKENBURG 13.78 10 7 -- 2.16 42.16 
YOUNGTOWN 1.51 13 2 5,305 5.07 42.71 
 
CHANDLER+ 63.60 294 142 126,710 3.19 42.68 
PHOENIX+ 513.7 2,916 894 1,764,259 6.68 66.57 
1 Maricopa Association of Governments 
2 Crime in the United States for 2004, jurisdiction noted with (+) indicates  internally provided figures effective April 14, 
2006. 
3 Estimated calls for service data provided by individual agencies. 
4 Arizona Department of Public Safety, 2004. 
 
                                                 
3 It is our understanding that the data shown in Table 1 might not be up-to-date by the time this report is 
distributed. Due to population growth in many West Valley cities, we found over the course of this study 
that West Valley police agencies were growing exponentially and communities were continuously 
authorizing increasing numbers of police personnel. 
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Table 2 shows socio-demographic characteristics for West Valley cities and the 
comparison study sites. The population of the West Valley sites varies considerably. The 
region contains four of the most populated cities in the state, yet three cities have 
populations under 10,000. According to 2005 Arizona Department of Economic Security 
population estimates, the largest population was in Glendale with more than 230,000 
residents; the smallest site was Youngtown with slightly more than 4,000 residents. 
 
Dramatic population growth is characteristic of the majority of sites. The growth rate for 
the entire West Valley in the past 5 years is approximately 42%. Eight of the cities 
experienced in excess of 25% growth, with five of these cities experiencing greater than 
80% percent growth. This is substantially greater than the growth rate of the two 
comparison sites and of Arizona. Since 2000, Arizona has had the second fastest 
population growth of any state, trailing only Nevada (ACJC, 2005). Table 2 shows 
projected growth for these cities. By 2010, Buckeye’s population is anticipated to nearly 
triple, and Surprise and Goodyear will increase by 47% and 49%, respectively. Cities 
such as El Mirage, Tolleson, Wickenburg, and Youngtown will experience slower 
growth. Avondale and Glendale will see growth spurts of 24% and 23%, while Peoria, 
Chandler, and Phoenix will grow at moderate rates of 17%, 12%, and 17%, respectively.  
 
Table 2 also demonstrates substantial ethnic variation among West Valley cities. The 
percentage of Hispanic population in the West Valley ranged from a high of 78% in 
Tolleson to a low of 11% in Wickenburg. Avondale, Buckeye, and El Mirage have the 
next highest percentages of Hispanic population. The overall median household income 
for the West Valley cities was $41,086. The range for the median household income for 
this region was a high of $57,492 in Goodyear and a low of $23,164 in Youngtown. 
Overall, however, the West Valley cities were similar to the median household income of 
Phoenix ($41,207).  
 
Table 2: Socio-demographic Characteristics for West Valley Cities 
Population Estimates1
Agency 2000 20052
%  
Change 
(Projected) 
20103
% Non-
Hispanic 
% 
Hispanic 
Median 
Household 
Income ($) 
AVONDALE 35,883 66,110 84.2  82,100 53.8 46.2 49,153 
BUCKEYE 6,537 20,780 317.8  58,600 63.3 36.7 35,383 
EL MIRAGE 7,609 29,630 389.4  29,700 33.2 66.8 33,813 
GLENDALE  218,812 236,030 7.8  290,400 75.2 24.8 45,015 
GOODYEAR 18,911 41,225 217.9  61,300 79.2 20.8 57,492 
PEORIA  108,364 137,295 26.6  160,800 84.6 15.4 52,199 
SURPRISE 30,848 78,265 253.7  115,200 76.7 23.3 44,156 
TOLLESON 4,974 5,460 9.7  6,100 22.0 78.0 38,773 
WICKENBURG 5,082 6,590 29.6  7,700 89.0 11.0 31,716 
YOUNGTOWN 3,010 4,055 34.7  5,400 87.3 12.7 23,164 
  
CHANDLER  176,581 231,785 31.2  260,000 79.0 21.0 58,416 
PHOENIX  1,321,045 1,452,825 9.9  1,700,300 65.9 34.1 41,207 
1 Except where noted, socio-demographic data were obtained from 2000 Census. 
2 Arizona Department of Economic Security: http://www.workforce.az.gov/admin/uploadedPublications/1943_EEC05.PDF
3 Maricopa Association of Governments 
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Research Design 
 
We interviewed multiple stakeholder groups because of the diverse nature of the 
participating agencies and their varying needs for information. In particular, we 
interviewed representatives from six stakeholder groups: patrol, investigations, crime 
analysts, CAD/RMS managers, homeland security, and command personnel. We believed 
that each of the stakeholder groups could offer a unique view as to their information 
needs, and different opinions about how a future, regional information-sharing initiative 
might be structured. We were interested in understanding their perceptions of information 
infrastructure and availability, current information use and sharing, regional information-
sharing needs, and potential obstacles to regional data sharing.  
 
Stakeholder interview schedules contained 10 to 16 questions. Although a predetermined 
list of questions was followed to guide discussions, participants were afforded significant 
range to discuss the topics and issues as they arose. This method allowed for cross-group 
comparisons, without sacrificing an environment in which individual groups could 
discuss issues of their own. Interview schedules can be found in Appendix A. 
 
Patrol and Investigations. The focus groups for the patrol and investigator 
sessions varied in numbers of participating officers with the size of the groups; they 
generally ranged between four and seven participants. The sessions typically lasted 
approximately an hour. Two facilitator-evaluators were present at each session, and all 
sessions were audio recorded for improved efficacy. Independent notes were taken  by 
each evaluator to maintain the integrity of their individual perceptions of each session; 
these were later compiled. The officers and investigators participating in the focus groups 
were selected by their agencies. In total, 31 focus group sessions were conducted with 
176 officers from 11 of the 12 participating agencies. Wickenburg was unable to meet 
within the time constraints imposed by our data collection and was not included in the 
patrol or investigation focus groups.  
 
Crime Analysts. Interviews were conducted with all six agencies. The interviews 
included a full-time crime analyst in the West Valley, and one crime analyst each from 
the Phoenix and Chandler police departments. Four agencies, Buckeye, El Mirage, 
Wickenburg, and Youngtown, were found not to have a full-time employee committed to 
the crime analyst function. The interviews lasted between 0.5 and 1.5 hours. We 
interviewed individuals who managed their crime analysis units or, in many cases, who 
were solely responsible for crime analysis within their agencies. Participation in the study 
was voluntary; all individuals who were asked to participate agreed.  
 
CAD/RMS Managers. Interviews were conducted with communications, 
records, and information technology staff in all 10 West Valley agencies and the Phoenix 
and Chandler police departments. All interviews were conducted in a group setting. They 
were focused on information management and systems within each of the agencies. The 
purpose of the interviews was to gain an understanding of current information 
management within the departments. Interviews lasted between 0.5 and 1.5 hours. 
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Homeland Security. Interviews were conducted with five police department 
commanders who currently oversaw homeland security issues. These interviews were 
combined with those for command personnel.4 Four of five interviewees indicated that 
for them, homeland security was one of many responsibilities. Interviews lasted about 
one hour. 
  
Command Personnel. Interviews were carried out with the chiefs of police and 
commanders in all of the West Valley agencies, except that the Wickenburg Chief of 
Police was not interviewed due to a scheduling conflict. The interviews were intended to 
provide an overview of agency information infrastructures, information about how 
commanders used data and shared information, and an overall assessment of the 
agencies’ willingness to use and share information with one another. Interviews lasted 
about one hour.  
 
Table 3: Data Collection Sources 
Patrol Investigations Crime Analysts 
CAD/RMS 
Managers 
Homeland 
Security 
Command 
Personnel 
Agency 
# Focus 
Groups 
# 
Persons 
# Focus 
Groups 
# 
Persons 
# 
Persons 
#          
Persons 
#    
Persons 
#    
Persons 
  
AVONDALE 2 5 1 5 1  4 --  2 
BUCKEYE 2 9 1 4 --  4  1  1 
EL MIRAGE 1 5 1 4 --  4  --  1 
GLENDALE 4 21 2 5 1  3  1 2 
GOODYEAR 1 4 1 4 1  1  --  1 
PEORIA 2 18 2 7 2 2  --  2 
SURPRISE 2 15 1 7 1  1  1 2 
TOLLESON 1 11 1 3 1  2  1  1 
WICKENBURG 0 0 0 0 --  1  -- 1 
YOUNGTOWN 1 5 1 2 --  1  1  1 
  
CHANDLER 1 10 1 8  1  2  -- --  
PHOENIX 1 15 1 9 1  6  1  3 
         
TOTAL  18 118 13 58 9 31 6 17 
 
 
                                                 
4 In Table 3, we did not double count these individuals. 
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In total, for the current needs assessment, we interviewed 239 sworn personnel and 
civilians and we held 31 focus groups, from 12 police agencies. The findings of our 
interviews are contained in the following sections. Although for the most part, the 
responses were quite consistent across the groups, some differences will be discussed. In 
addition, on some occasions, individuals within the groups (patrol and investigations) 
presented conflicting information. Given the complexity and rapid growth of information 
technology and individual information systems, this was expected.  
 
 Web Site Applications. To obtain further insight into the ways in which police 
departments and other criminal justice agencies use and present data, we examined more 
than 100 Web sites. We wanted to determine whether agencies outside of this study used 
specific software applications for data collection, mapping, and analysis. In addition, we 
wanted to obtain a picture of how data are more generally used and presented to the 
public in the state of Arizona and nationally. The Glendale Police Department provided a 
list of law enforcement and criminal justice agency Web sites from across the country 
and Arizona.  
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Section III:  Patrol Officer Findings 
 
Overview of Information Systems 
 
Each focus group opened with introductions of the participants and a brief overview of 
the scope of the project. We began the discussion by inquiring what information 
technology (IT) hardware and software was available to officers in the field and how 
comfortable they were using these tools. They were asked for their perceptions of the 
performance of their in-field IT resources.  
 
Fourteen of the groups identified the squad car computer, or mobile data 
computer/terminal (MDC/MDT), as the primary piece of IT equipment used by their 
agencies. The other two agencies, Youngtown and El Mirage5, did not have MDCs in 
their vehicles.6 A majority of the groups (69%) also identified their agencies’ record 
management systems (RMS) as being available, although only five groups identified the 
call for service (CFS) or computer-aided dispatch (CAD) systems as part of their IT 
equipment. The responses to this question could suggest that for some agencies, the line 
between their RMS and CAD systems might be fairly seamless, so that officers were less 
aware of differences between the two.  
 
Officers reported that they were comfortable with their systems and found them generally 
reliable; the systems were easy to use and data was easy to retrieve. Some officers (from 
four groups) complained  that their systems were slow. The following problems with IT 
systems or devices were also cited: “time-consuming to use,” “limited training on 
system,” and “not user-friendly.” 
 
Officers in the focus groups said that the bulk of the information they had available in the 
field was person data, directly related to specific individuals. Specific characteristics and 
information about an individual were most frequently identified as the items accessible to 
officers in the field. These data included names, social security numbers, dates of birth, 
physical vitals (i.e., height, weight, hair color, eye color), and race or ethnicity.  
 
Several groups indicated difficulties with obtaining address-level (place) information 
while in the field. Only six groups indicated that they had access to information about a 
person’s last known or previous addresses. Ten groups stated that they could retrieve 
information about a driver’s history (e.g., suspended license, prior DUI) and outstanding 
wants and warrants (available through NCIC/ACIC). Nine groups reported having access 
to comprehensive information regarding their own agencies’ prior contact with a person, 
and eight groups reported that they retrieved criminal histories through dispatch’s use of 
an ACJIS terminal. 
 
The most commonly discussed property data were vehicle registration and plate 
information from the Motor Vehicle Division. Seven groups reported having access to 
                                                 
5 El Mirage, in conjunction with Arizona’s Office of Homeland Security and the Maricopa County Sheriff’s 
Office, is in the process of implementing MDC technology, expecting completion in the coming months. 
6 In non-patrol officer interviews, we found that Wickenburg also lacked laptop computers in vehicles.  
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vehicle registration information. Other property-related information, chiefly about stolen 
property, was identified as what typically would be found in NCIC/ACIC sources. Four 
groups named NCIC/ACIC; five cited stolen or recovered firearms and six cited access to 
stolen property information from other jurisdictions, in accord with NCIC/ACIC 
definitions. The latter reported that they could also search property criteria for stolen or 
recovered property within their own jurisdictions.  
 
Information as it related to physical locations, whether places of business or residences, 
was largely unavailable, in the perceptions of our participants. Seven groups identified 
call for service (CFS) histories for given addresses as available, but that information was 
limited to whatever dispatch and the responding officer may have captured at the time of 
the original call. For example, an officer might access the CFS history at a particular 
address and find previous calls to that address, the nature of the calls, the responding 
officers’ disposition codes (e.g., arrest, report taken, no action), and perhaps brief 
narratives (e.g., “arrested Subject 1 told Subject 2 not to return to address until 
tomorrow,” or “no action taken”). Officers described CFS information as limited, noting 
that often the history will not go back far enough, or it might fail to distinguish between 
apartment numbers within a given complex. Brief narratives and disposition codes were 
frequently incomplete, providing insufficient information for an officer to base action 
upon. No other location-specific data elements were mentioned by more than four groups, 
including address searches, hazard flags, mapping or routing information, and 
information about the current occupant or owner of the given address. 
 
The various groups identified nearly three dozen distinct information sources and 
resources as available in the office, but not available in the field. Three groups indicated 
no significant gaps between the types of information available to them both in the office 
and in the field. El Mirage and Youngtown indicated that although they could get the 
same information whether in the office or in the field, they were required to go through 
their dispatchers for field information needs because they did not have MDCs. The most 
frequent gap reported between the types of information available from the office and the 
types available from the field involved NCIC/ACIC databases that were not available 
from the field (five groups). Three groups reported not having access to ACJIS and 
complete reports with full narratives.  
 
When asked whether they would like information that they did not currently have 
available in the field, participants were able to identify nearly 50 items. The majority fell 
within the categories of person data and operational information. These were evenly 
distributed between the two categories, and accounted for 80% of the items mentioned. 
The remaining 20% fell into the combined categories of place and property. One officer 
noted that “the system is good, it’s easy to use, but we can’t get anybody else’s info…and 
that’s not enough.”  
 
Forty percent of the focus groups requested information or MDC access to information 
that would enhance their pool of data about individuals, whether suspects, victims, 
witnesses, or contacts. The data element requested most often was a photograph attached 
to personal data, either a driver’s license photo or booking photo. Even those agencies 
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currently able to retrieve photos asked that the service be expanded to include photos 
from other agencies. Currently, some agencies can view booking photos for individuals 
arrested and booked by their own agency, but the officers found this insufficient. They 
wanted their systems to include MVD photos and photos from other agencies; eleven 
groups requested photos from at least one and preferably both sources. One officer asked 
for “booking photos, driver’s license, anything with a face.” Other person data requested 
by five or more groups included criminal histories, driver’s license histories, officer 
safety hazards, prior contact with other agencies, and direct access to PACE from MDCs. 
 
Feedback was solicited from agencies regarding performance of duties and desired 
improvements to the hardware and software of their current systems. In this category,  
both El Mirage and Youngtown (agencies without MDCs) requested to have MDCs in all 
patrol vehicles. Seven groups requested the most commonly desired operational 
enhancement: MDCs with e-mail and/or instant messaging capability. Officers wanted to 
communicate among themselves and across shifts while in the field, and to have briefings 
electronically disseminated and available during the shift.  
 
Officers also wanted MDCs to give them access to hot sheets of persons flagged for 
Attempt to Locate (ATLs), recently stolen vehicles, and areas of recently increasing 
criminal activity (e.g., burglaries, auto thefts). They wanted access to complete reports 
with full narratives and to the Internet. One officer from El Mirage explained: 
 
 …we need MDTs, where we can get prior contacts with other agencies with 
names, addresses, photos, physical descriptions, vitals, stolen vehicle and property 
searches, access to full reports and narratives, driver’s history, GPS with mapping 
and routing info, with touch-screens, a full-sized illuminated keypad, oh, and 
officer safety alerts, whether it’s medical, or violent, or a drug house.  
 
Information Sharing and Analysis  
 
One of the two most commonly requested items related to property or location data was 
mapping and routing information, provided by a GPS unit, to guide officers to unfamiliar 
addresses when responding to calls for service. An officer in one focus group was explicit 
about wanting “a mapping system with routing info, like a GPS, and topo or aerial 
photos, lot plots, and street maps.” The other item most commonly requested was the 
ability to do comprehensive license plate and registration checks directly from MDCs. 
Five groups requested direct access to NCIC/ACIC from their vehicles, and three groups 
asked for the ability to search firearm serial numbers.  
 
Ten focus groups representing eight of the nine agencies rated the process of information 
sharing among officers within their own agencies as “poor,” with eight groups from six 
agencies citing a lack of routine and reliable information sharing between precincts and 
shifts. Asked about the information that was shared, officers most frequently reported that 
it pertained to addresses to be aware of and other officer safety issues. Eight groups from 
six agencies indicated that briefing packets for a given shift, either hardcopy or e-mail, 
were the most common means of sharing information with patrols.  
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Asked what information was wanted from other officers and investigators within their 
own agencies, the majority (ten groups from seven agencies) asked for Attempt to Locate 
(ATL) suspect information. Six groups from four agencies wanted to be aware of areas or 
addresses either to watch or avoid, and five groups from four agencies wanted 
information about ongoing investigations and what a patrol officer’s response should be 
if encountering a person or location related to the investigation. An illustration of this 
need was provided by an officer who explained that “being unaware if detectives are 
working a house could blow the investigation, or put us in danger, not knowing what we 
could be walking into.” 
  
Nine groups representing six agencies reported very limited (poor) communication and 
information sharing on the part of other agencies. Often, such communication occurred 
during rare and coincidental face-to-face contacts between two officers; this was reported 
by seven groups from five agencies. The most commonly shared information across 
jurisdictions, reported by seven groups from six agencies, was Attempt to Locate (ATL) 
alerts for persons, stolen vehicles, or vehicles suspected in a crime. Some groups 
described, as an example of typical cross-jurisdictional information sharing, a scenario in 
which sergeants from two different agencies would park together somewhere, each 
listening to the other’s radio traffic and then relaying it over their own radios.  
 
ATL alerts for persons or vehicles was the information most wanted from other 
jurisdictions, reported by six groups representing six agencies. Four groups from four 
agencies wanted crime trend data from neighboring communities, or better, from across 
the metropolitan area. Other information desired by at least three groups included the 
following: (a) ongoing investigations, (b) criminal histories, (c) officer safety issues or 
hazards, (d) prior police contacts, (e) compatible radio frequencies, (f) e-mail or instant 
messaging in the field, (g) MVD or booking photos, and (h) more detailed person data, 
including known family and associates linked to a person; scars, marks, and tattoos; and 
last known addresses.   
 
Not all agencies had full-time crime analysts, but most patrol officers were aware of the 
kinds of resources and services that an analyst could provide. Asked what information 
they would want from crime analysts, 10 groups representing eight agencies answered 
that they wanted predictive maps. Although their preferences varied between predictions 
based on zones and predictions based on timeframes, the groups were in agreement on 
the desirability of geographically based guidance for proactive policing efforts. Three 
additional mapping deliverables were requested by nine groups: (a) beat-level crime trend 
data, requested by six agencies, (b) hot spots, or areas with recently high crime rates, 
requested by six agencies, and (c) crime trends by location or area of the city and by 
crime type (e.g., construction site burglaries, auto thefts, home invasions), requested by 
seven agencies. About products and services offered by crime analysts, officers 
commented that crime trend maps were “good to structure patrol time,” for letting 
officers know “what’s going on in my area,” and for showing trends in “preventable 
crimes.”  
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Homeland Security 
 
Eight groups from five agencies reported having received some training in how to 
respond during an incident involving a weapon of mass destruction (WMD), whether 
radiological, biological, chemical, or other. Nine groups representing six agencies 
reported receiving training in the Incident Command System (ICS). The five agencies 
that reported receiving WMD training were among the six agencies that reported 
receiving ICS training, illustrating that the two most commonly reported trainings were 
being offered by the same agencies. Glendale and Peoria reported receiving mobile field 
force or riot control training. Also of note, five groups representing four agencies 
reported that the frequency and quality of their major incidence response training had 
been poor or inadequate. Two groups from separate agencies rated the mobile field force 
training negatively, with one commenting that “we trained with Scottsdale, Tempe, and 
Gilbert - nobody from the West Valley, nobody who would actually be close enough to 
help.” Another commented, “It’s a joke. It’s like marching band practice.”  
 
When asked what kind of information would be most useful or desirable when 
responding to a major incident, 11 groups from eight agencies said that the most 
important information for patrol officers to have is the specific hazard or threat level 
involved. Eight groups from seven agencies wanted routing information for incoming 
emergency responders or for evacuation routes. Other frequent requests were for 
perimeter information (seven groups from six agencies) and for more interagency training 
(nine groups from six agencies). 
 
Phoenix and Chandler Patrol Focus Group Summary 
 
Focus groups were held with the Chandler and Phoenix police departments for 
comparative purposes. Based upon the outcome of the focus groups, the Chandler Police 
Department had more needs in common with the West Valley law enforcement agencies 
than did the Phoenix Police Department. Chandler aligned more closely with the West 
Valley agencies regarding the need for specific data elements such as ATLs, file stop 
information, and other agency crime trends. For the most part, the Phoenix Police 
Department reported having better access to internal information and across jurisdictions; 
therefore, it did not have the same needs as the West Valley agencies. The Phoenix 
agency did share the interest of Chandler and the West Valley agencies in having crime 
trend data across jurisdictions, photos, and officer safety information. Overall, responses 
from the Chandler and Phoenix police departments were consistent with typical responses 
from the West Valley agencies, even though some differences were noted.  
 
Major Findings: Patrol 
 
• Agencies without MDCs (El Mirage, Wickenburg, and Youngtown) need this 
equipment. 
• Consistencies in reporting occurred across agencies, regardless of agency size. 
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• Agencies across the board expressed a strong need to be able to retrieve photos 
from the MVD, whether booking photos or photos from other criminal justice 
agencies. 
• Better access is needed to information within agencies directly from MDCs, rather 
than through dispatch or across agencies. 
• Greater deficiencies in technology appeared in smaller jurisdictions. 
• Many groups and agencies implicitly or explicitly identified a need for training in 
the capabilities and use of their respective systems and processes. 
• Better access to ACJIS information is needed. 
• Better access to PACE information is needed. 
• Increased information from crime analysts is needed, including:  
o predictive maps, 
o crime trend information for agency and surrounding jurisdictions, and 
o hot spot analysis. 
• Better ability to share geographic or address-level information is needed. 
• Although not within the scope of this study, the need for interagency radio 
communication is an issue for West Valley law enforcement agencies. 
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Section IV:  Investigator Findings 
 
Overview of Information Systems 
 
Evaluators began sessions with investigators by inquiring what information technology 
(IT) hardware and software was available to them, how comfortable they were using 
these tools, and their general perceptions of the technologies’ performance. All groups of 
investigators reported having access to a desktop computer at their stations. Five groups 
from five agencies reported having a field radio, a cell phone, and Internet access in the 
office. Five groups from five agencies reported having difficulty getting access to 
databases or extracting data from their systems. Only three groups from two agencies 
reported being completely comfortable with their systems. One of those groups stated 
that its system was “very easy to use…but it’s limited to locally inputted data only.” 
Another group reporting difficulties said that “it left a lot to be desired.” 
 
The information that investigators reported as being available through their systems was 
primarily person data, but it included data elements tied to property or location. Of 
approximately 45 different data elements identified by the investigators, more than 71% 
were person data; 15% was place data, and 15% was property data. The investigators’ 
emphasis on person data is a strong indication of the type of information they routinely 
want and need. More than 30 types of person-related information were cited by 
investigators, including information gathered from a variety of sources. The list of 
information resources investigators currently use in the office includes the following: 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the AZTEC court record system, the 
Rocky Mountain Information Network (RMIN), Arizona Child Protective Services 
(CPS), the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), the Arizona Department of 
Corrections (ADC), and the National Insurance Crime Bureau (NCIB).  
 
Six groups representing six agencies said that they had access to comprehensive criminal 
history records and internal arrest records. Six groups from five agencies reported also 
having access to Field Interview (FI) cards gathered within their own agencies. Seven or 
more groups from six or more agencies reported that for persons entered into their 
systems through a prior contact or arrest by their agency, they had access to names and 
aliases; physical descriptions (height, weight, hair color, eye color); scars, marks, and 
tattoos; race/ethnicity; date of birth; social security number; and address and contact 
information. 
 
Nine groups from eight agencies said they could use a serial number or vehicle 
identification number (VIN) to retrieve information that had been entered into their 
agency’s system regarding stolen property. Seven agencies reported being able to search 
for stolen property information entered in their systems using property descriptions. Six 
groups from five agencies said they had the ability to check the status of property that had 
been logged into their systems, whether as evidence, stolen, recovered, or some other 
status. Investigators said that although they could search for a specific piece of property, 
usually by serial number, property entries were not typically cross-referenced; they could 
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not retrieve an inventory of all property entries attached to a single report number without 
reviewing the original report narrative. 
 
The most commonly identified place-related data were from Call For Service (CFS) 
histories, reported by eight groups from seven agencies. CFS data includes the nature of 
the calls, time of occurrence, who responded, action taken, and whether or not a report 
was generated. Seven groups from seven agencies said that they could retrieve 
information for a given address about different individuals who had been contacted there. 
Only three groups from three agencies mentioned having flags for addresses that would 
alert officers to specific hazards or potential officer safety issues. 
 
Investigators overwhelmingly wanted access to the same data in the field that were 
available in the office. Nine groups from eight agencies requested mobile data computers 
or terminals (MDC/MDT) or laptops for use in the field, preferably with full access to 
their agencies’ record management systems (RMS). Nine groups from seven agencies 
wanted MVD or booking photos linked to name searches from Maricopa County or other 
local jurisdictions. Six groups from six agencies asked for direct MDC access to warrant 
checks for all local, county, and statewide agencies. Four other desirable items were 
identified by at least four groups from four agencies: (a) field access to NCIC/ACIC 
records, (b) access to PACE from MDC, (c) officer safety alerts, and (d) electronic access 
to FI cards. One detective described their dilemma succinctly: “We don’t have laptops or 
MDTs, so we have no database access in the field.” An investigator from a different 
jurisdiction wanted “access to full narratives” and “access to MCSO bookings, with 
photos, facility info, everything.”  
 
Information Sharing and Analysis  
 
Five groups from five agencies said that they shared “almost everything” with other 
officers and detectives within their own agency. Eight groups from seven agencies 
reported sharing Attempt To Locate (ATL) suspect information, and six groups from five 
agencies said that they shared ATL information about persons for whom the investigator 
had probable cause for an arrest. Five of the investigator groups from five agencies said 
they also shared officer safety or hazard information routinely.  
 
Field Interview (FI) card information was the most commonly requested item among the 
investigator focus groups, mentioned by six groups from six different agencies. Five 
groups from five agencies placed a high priority on information specific to suspects and 
witnesses and their associates. Detectives in three agencies wanted more detailed reports 
from their patrol officers. The value that investigators placed on these three elements 
further illustrated the importance attributed to person data. One detective, describing the 
use of FI cards, said they were “the best intel, but they’re very delayed.” This statement 
expressed not only the value the detective placed on FI card information, but the 
importance of having the most recent and relevant data. The impact of the chain of 
information exchange between patrol officers and investigators on investigations was 
supported by another detective who explained that “patrol often has a lot of intelligence 
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info about people and activities,” implying the importance to investigators of getting that 
information.  
 
The most common means of sharing information across jurisdictions by investigators was 
reported as some form of monthly meeting of regional investigators. Nine groups from 
eight agencies identified a routine investigators’ meeting as the typical means by which 
they share information, with the most frequently mentioned being the West Valley 
Investigators Association monthly meeting. These meetings typically include information 
about a series of linked cases, known details about an unknown suspect or investigative 
lead, recent trends and updates, and any other information a detective may want to share 
regarding ongoing cases. 
 
Investigators placed a high priority on person data from other jurisdictions, especially 
data from FI cards that reflect all prior contact with any agency in the county or state. 
They also would like detailed information about suspects in open cases, such as name and 
vitals, last known address, vehicles registered to the person, and known associates and 
their contact information. A detective from one agency stated simply that he wanted 
“everything from everyone.” An investigator from another agency asked for “person data 
from any and all agencies.” Both of these statements exemplify the desire of investigators 
to have improved access to person data from other jurisdictions. Seven groups 
representing six agencies wanted information about ongoing investigations in other 
jurisdictions that might affect their own or that have parallel interests. Additionally, five 
groups from five agencies wanted crime trend data from other jurisdictions, particularly 
from those who share a border. 
 
With the exception of a single group, investigator focus groups identified predictive 
trends as the most desirable crime analyses for their work. Predictive maps and trends 
identifying probabilities of when and/or where the next in a series or type of crime might 
occur were most favored. Seven agencies also asked for general crime trend data. Six 
wanted crime-specific hot spot data and four requested general mapping or geographic 
analysis. One group asked for predictions about specific crime types with probabilities 
for different days, times, and locations, making the forecasting “as narrow as possible.” 
Another wanted better forecasting and prediction maps, and added, referring to municipal 
boundaries, that “border trend data would be helpful.” Two groups without a full-time 
crime analyst asked for one. One detective, asked what he wanted from a crime analyst, 
exclaimed, “Anything!” 
 
All but one agency reported having at least one unit-based database that stored a variety 
of information that was not part of the agency’s standard system. Examples of the unit-
based databases included: (a) repeat offenders, (b) street crimes, (c) drug/narcotics 
investigations, (d) sex offenders, (e)  robberies, (f) gangs, (g) pawn records, (h) traffic 
services, (i) entertainment district enforcement squad, (j) case management files, and (k) 
victim advocates. The only unit-based database that investigators said would not likely be 
made available to anyone outside the given unit was the one for victim’s advocacy. All 
others could be made available at least in part, if not entirely. Most agencies would be 
willing to share their unit-based databases, but at least one said that they preferred to 
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share information with investigators based on specific requests and that they would not 
want to have “proactive distribution” or on-demand open access to other agencies. 
 
Homeland Security Training and Information 
 
Investigators received training more frequently than patrol groups, with six or more 
groups and agencies receiving training in Hazmat recognition and response; the proper 
application and use of personal protection equipment (PPE), or protective suits, eyewear, 
gas masks, and the like; and Incident Command System (ICS) training. ICS training 
occurred locally and in Anniston, Virginia. Law enforcement officers were provided 
training on policies and procedures to govern major emergency events of a radiological, 
biological, chemical, or other catastrophic event. ICS training focused on command and 
control procedures, roles and responsibilities of first responders and support personnel, 
and staging, routing, and perimeter control techniques. The groups indicated some 
dissatisfaction with training. For example they commented that their WMD training was 
too brief (a single 8-hour class), and that the school shooting scenario training was 4 
years ago and they had received no follow-up training. Participants also indicated that 
they needed “more hands-on training” and “mutual aid training.” Generally, the groups 
felt a need for greater cooperative training among West Valley agencies, with higher 
standards of competency and proficiency and more frequent repetition. 
 
Investigators were asked to provide the most important information needed when 
responding to a major incident. The information cited as most important by the majority 
of agencies was the location of the incident command and the staging areas for various 
responders. Closely behind, with nine groups from eight agencies agreeing, is the specific 
nature of the problem: Is it a shooter? Are there hostages? Is it a chemical spill? Was 
there an explosion? They also need to know the type of hazards present, the threat level 
to responders and the public, and any other type of information available about the nature 
and extent of the incident. Also of note, seven agencies identified interagency compatible 
radio contact as critical, and six groups from five agencies wanted to know their roles and 
responsibilities at the scene.  
 
Phoenix and Chandler Focus Group Summary 
 
Focus groups of investigators were conducted in Chandler and Phoenix as comparison 
groups for the West Valley agencies. Overall, detectives in Phoenix and Chandler 
expressed resources and needs in common with their West Valley counterparts. For 
issues related to information systems, Chandler reported the same IT resources that were 
most frequently cited by West Valley detectives, including a computer in the office with 
the agency’s RMS and Internet access, and only having radios and/or cell phones in the 
field. Phoenix agreed on eleven of the thirteen most frequently identified data elements 
available through the given agency’s system, including various person data elements 
(names, aliases, physical descriptions, demographics, addresses); internal arrest records; 
comprehensive criminal histories; stolen property entries; and CFS histories. Neither 
Chandler nor Phoenix reported any difficulties accessing or using information from their 
respective systems.  
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For responses related to information sharing and analysis, Phoenix also expressed a 
desire that was strongly aligned with that of agencies from the West Valley for 
information available in the field. Phoenix and Chandler both shared and wanted 
information from within their own respective agencies and from other jurisdictions, 
compatible with the most frequently identified elements among West Valley agencies. 
Regarding information from crime analysts, Chandler detectives expressed a desire for 
more specific crime trend data, but Phoenix largely expressed complete satisfaction with 
the products and services currently available from their crime analysts, an opinion that 
only one West Valley group shared. Both Chandler and Phoenix reported using unit-
based databases and expressed a willingness to share some of that information with other 
law enforcement agencies.  
 
Phoenix and Chandler detectives reported having received both Hazmat and PPE training, 
but Phoenix detectives also reported having received ICS, National Incident Management 
System (NIMS), WMD, and Mobile Field Force training, as well. Both Chandler and 
Phoenix agreed with the majority of West Valley agencies that interagency radio 
compatibility would be critical for a major incident response, and Phoenix also agreed 
with the majority of West Valley agencies in identifying the importance of knowing the 
nature and level of the threat, and information regarding the locations of command and 
control, and of various staging areas.  
 
For those items that would be most important to any data sharing initiative, Phoenix 
investigators identified three of the top four items identified by West Valley agencies: 
shared RMS data, prior law enforcement contact data, and photographs. Chandler did not 
identify any of the common West Valley data elements, but did place an emphasis on 
more detailed person data. Overall, investigators in the Phoenix focus group seemed more 
in line than Chandler detectives with the perceptions and concerns of the West Valley 
groups. 
 
Major Findings:  Investigators   
 
• Most investigators had no field access to departmental information resources,  
other than through radio dispatch, unlike patrol’s access to MDC/Ts. 
• Investigators make significantly greater use of person data, primarily related to: 
o Names, aliases, descriptors, demographics, and identifiers; 
o Known associates, last known and previous addresses, and contact 
numbers; and 
o Prior contact with other law enforcement agencies. 
• Focus groups reported their use of property information was primarily to search 
for and identify stolen property and vehicles. 
• Call For Service histories and the people contacted at a given address were the 
most common use of place data by investigators. 
• All investigators had access to computers and a variety of database, Internet, and 
software resources in the office, but these were not routinely available in the field. 
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• Attempt to Locate alerts are the most common type of information shared by 
detectives within an agency. 
• Detectives want more frequent and timely use of Field Interview card information 
from patrol officers within their agency. 
• Information derived from Field Interview cards generated in other agencies is 
important to investigators. 
• Investigators primarily use meetings (typically attended monthly) as a means of 
sharing information with members of other agencies about ongoing cases, suspect 
details, and modus operandi patterns. 
• Access to crime trend data from neighboring jurisdictions was also requested. 
• Prediction trend maps were identified as the most useful and/or desirable product 
from crime analysts. 
• Most agencies have at least one unit-based database used by investigators and are 
willing to share them with other law enforcement agencies. 
• The majority of investigators received some form of training in major incident 
response strategies and procedures. 
• Investigators identified the most important information to have during a major 
incident as: 
o Staging areas 
o Command and control location 
o Nature and level of threat 
o Specific role and responsibility at scene 
• The list of most-wanted for investigators included: 
o Access to internal and interagency RMS data in the field 
o Person data and prior police contact from other jurisdictions 
o Cross-jurisdictional radio compatibility 
o Photos – MVD/Booking – available electronically in the field 
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Section V:  Crime Analyst Findings 
 
Information Infrastructure 
 
Crime analysts were asked about the kinds of data that they had access to for analytic 
purposes. Our interviews indicated that most of the crime analysts were limited to data 
obtained through their agencies’ CAD/RMS systems. The only exception was the 
Glendale Police Department. The Glendale analyst had eight sources of data available for 
analysis: CAD/RMS, arrest, traffic, person, gang, probation, and data related to unit-level 
activities, persons, and places that were involved with drug activity. 
 
We asked about the data collection software that the crime analysts used with their CAD 
and RMS systems. Crime analysts from Surprise, Avondale, and Tolleson indicated that 
their agencies relied on software products from Spillman Corporation. The Peoria Police 
Department relied on a software package from HTE Corporation, and the Goodyear 
Police Department uses New World System, a product similar to Spillman’s. The 
Glendale Police Department was the only agency that developed its own software for 
CAD/RMS. The Glendale system, developed by the city’s IT section in 1985, is called 
CHIPS (Computer Handled Incident Program System). City information technology (IT) 
departments support the CAD/RMS systems for all of the interviewed agencies, with the 
exceptions of the Goodyear Police Department, where CAD/RMS is managed by the city 
telecommunications department, and Surprise, where the police department manages the 
CAD/RMS and the city IT and telecommunications department provides network 
support. 
 
All of the crime analysts were asked about the analytic software they used on the job. 
Four of the six analysts stated that they used Microsoft products such as Access and 
Excel. Analysts from three agencies stated that they used ArcGIS for crime mapping, and 
three analysts stated that they used ATAC (Automated Tactical Analysis of Crime) to 
examine crime trends by day of week, time of day, and offense type. Two crime analysts 
stated that Spillman provided a number of prefabricated queries to produce canned 
reports, and one crime analyst explained that he also uses software products such as 
Curve Expert, Crime Stat, and I2. One analyst used RIGEL for geographic profiling. 
 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) Capacity 
 
We asked the crime analysts whether their cities had a geographic information system 
(GIS) section or department and if so, whether they had access to it. All of the analysts 
stated that their cities had a GIS section or department, with the exception of Tolleson. 
Likewise, all of the crime analysts except Goodyear’s stated that they had access to their 
GIS section or department. In Goodyear, the analyst explained that because of recent, 
rapid growth and development, police requests for crime mapping and other GIS-related 
matters were not a high priority for the GIS department, and thus, they still had limited 
access. Surprise Police Department’s analyst explained that their city’s GIS department 
was always helpful in providing crime maps to the police. The analyst at the Glendale 
Police Department said that their unit actually had more capacity for crime mapping than 
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the city’s GIS section did; he attributed this to the availability of data and their 
experience and training in conducting crime analysis and mapping. Perhaps the most 
interesting GIS infrastructure was found in the city of Avondale. Avondale’s crime 
analyst explained that the city had an informal GIS committee comprised of 
representatives from fire, police, utilities, and engineering. That committee meets 
regularly to share ideas, data, and shape files pertaining to schools, crime, roads, floor 
plans of apartment complexes, and other critical infrastructures.  
 
With one exception, all of the crime analysts stated that they used or had access to ESRI 
products. Although two of the agencies still used ArcGIS v. 3.2, all agencies expected to 
have access to v. 9.0 in the near future. Of the six analysts interviewed, only one 
(Tolleson Police Department) did not have access to any ESRI product, but that one was 
able to conduct crime mapping through Spillman, which includes queries for rapid 
production of crime maps and other geographic forms of analysis. 
 
Perceived Reliability, Validity, and Timeliness of Data 
 
We asked the analysts about the reliability and validity of their data. Although all of the 
crime analysts believed that their data had been generally reliable and valid in recent 
years, they were able to identify data elements that were weaker relative to the rest of 
their data. Modus operandi (MO)were the most commonly cited examples. Specifically, 
analysts stated that officers and detectives rarely took time to complete MO information. 
Often this information was either missing from the records or officers had not included 
specific data elements. For example, officers might fail to include information pertaining 
to the method of entry into the home, in the case of a burglary, or language used, in the 
case of a robbery. Analysts explained that many officers do not like to enter data and MO 
data is easy to omit from reports. Three analysts explained that physical descriptions of 
suspects are not detailed in reports and officers frequently failed to include information 
on the suspect’s weight, height, physical identifiers, and age. Two analysts stated that a 
major problem with their data was related to geo-coding. They maintained that officers 
often did not include the address of the crime or failed to confirm the location of the 
crime when that field was automatically populated as part of the data-capturing process. 
 
Four analysts explained that problems with data occurred because their officers did not 
correct erroneous dispatch data. For example, if a citizen called the police about a 
burglary, when in fact it was a theft, the officer who investigated the original call might 
fail to contact the dispatcher to change the offense code entered into the CAD/RMS 
system. The analysts also said that in some instances, when property was recovered, 
officers would not update the report in the CAD/RMS system. Two crime analysts stated 
that their agencies’ property data were not reliable. This was particularly problematic in 
Glendale where the majority of property data was kept in physical files and was missing 
from the department’s electronic information system. One analyst believed that his 
agency had poor quality control on electronic records and that there were problems with 
the how data fields were automatically populated. One analyst said that because of this, 
time and date data were often unreliable. 
 
 26
We asked crime analysts about their perceptions of the most neglected information on 
reports. Four of the six analysts stated that MO data were the most neglected. Many 
pointed out that in the case of burglaries, information such as mode of entry is often 
missing (e.g., cut lock, “crash and dash”). At least one analyst explained that in as many 
as 95% of reports, MO data are missing. Three of the analysts stated that physical 
description data were the most neglected. They stated that officers often failed to include 
such information as physical marks, scars, tattoos, hair length, and general appearance on 
their reports. Two crime analysts stated that specific information regarding stolen 
property was not regularly entered into their department’s information systems, and one 
analyst expressed having little confidence in his department’s address data.  
 
We asked the crime analysts in each agency about the timeliness of their data. Most of 
the analysts indicated that their data were fairly timely, and referred to policies that 
required reports to be entered into their information systems within a reasonable period. 
From our interviews, we found a clear relationship between agency size and the period of 
time taken to enter data: The larger the agency, the longer it took to enter data. For 
example, in Goodyear, Tolleson, and Avondale, reports were required to be entered 
electronically by the end of each shift. If there were extenuating circumstances, officers 
could request a few more days to complete this task. In Surprise and Peoria, it could take 
up to 7 days for data to be entered into the information system and to become available 
for departmental use. In Glendale, the largest police department in the West Valley, data 
is less timely. Many reports might not be available in the department’s information 
system for as long as 20 days. Due to such delays, the Glendale Police Department has 
instituted a prioritization system. Those arrested and booked in the city’s jail facility are 
entered first, followed by crimes against persons, and then by property crime reports. 
 
Information Sharing Infrastructure 
 
We asked crime analysts about the software applications they used for data sharing and 
terrorism prevention. Four of the crime analysts stated that they relied on Microsoft Excel 
to share information within and between agencies. Three agencies reported using 
Microsoft Access. One agency reported using ArcGIS for space-based information; 
another relied upon ATAC (Automated Tactical Analysis of Crime) to share data 
pertaining to crime; still another used PDF files to share information. We found that four 
agencies (Avondale, Surprise, Buckeye, and Tolleson) used Spillman products and that 
they would soon have the capacity to share their CAD/RMS data through a central node 
housed at the Department of Public Safety.  
 
Likewise, we asked crime analysts about their perceptions of the most applicable or 
useful software for sharing information across jurisdictions. Three of the six crime 
analysts believed that COPLINK was the most useful because it already was in use by 
Phoenix and Tucson, two of the major police agencies in the state. Two analysts agreed 
that Spillman had a strong product for sharing information, but one stated that this 
preference was based on the fact that their agency already was using it. The other stated 
that COPLINK would be just as effective; he was “not that happy” with Spillman because 
it did not permit in-depth, aggregate analysis of crime problems. One crime analyst stated 
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that he was not sure which system would be best, and another believed that Microsoft 
Access would be best for data sharing. 
 
Information Sharing 
 
We asked analysts about the information they shared with other jurisdictions. Four of the 
six analysts stated that they did share information with crime analysts and detectives 
outside their agency. The Surprise Police Department’s representative stated that they did 
not share much information yet, but would in the near future. Tolleson’s representative 
stated that they shared information only with Buckeye Police Department, with whom 
they had a data-sharing arrangement. The other four crime analysts (Avondale, Peoria, 
Glendale, and Goodyear) said that they most often shared information pertaining to 
patterns of crime (e.g., MO data) to determine the extent to which crime series might be 
taking place across the valley within their jurisdiction. Two agencies reported that they 
shared crime report information and information related to stolen property; one shared 
sex offender data, one shared information on border crime patterns with adjacent police 
agencies, and one shared information on population trends and uniform crime statistics. 
 
We asked crime analysts about the types of data and information that they would like to 
obtain from other jurisdictions. All six of the crime analysts stated that person data were 
most needed: a person’s last known address, criminal history, potential for violence, and 
a photograph. Four agencies identified a need for MO data to spot crime series events, 
and two analysts stated that they needed information that could be obtained through the 
RMS systems of other agencies. One analyst also expressed a need for crime trend data, 
and another wanted information on vehicles. 
 
Crime analysts were asked about the types of data they most often used from their 
information systems. Four of the six analysts stated that they frequently used place-based 
data to examine hot spots. Analysts explained that these data were used by patrol officers 
and operation level managers for the purpose of directing patrol activities and for 
allocating resources. Two of the analysts stated that they used data from police reports to 
examine offense patterns within the city. Additionally, two analysts stated that they used 
Calls for Service data for presentations at city council meetings. One analyst used event 
data to look for series crimes, and another used person data to help officers obtain mug 
shots and to identify persons on probation or who had outstanding warrants for arrest. 
 
We also asked crime analysts about the data that they provided to their officers and 
detectives. We found that analysts shared different types of data with each group. Four of 
the analysts shared information with patrol for the purpose of helping them guide their 
directed patrol activities. Specifically, they provided them with information on crime 
trends by time, day of week, and location. Three of the analysts shared “look-out-for” 
information with patrol officers. This included information on wanted persons and 
vehicles that patrol officers should be on the watch for. Surprise Police Department’s 
crime analyst shared information on traffic trends and person data related to outstanding 
warrants and those on probation. Goodyear’s crime analyst provided that agency’s patrol 
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officers with information about crime series taking place in their jurisdiction and in 
surrounding areas. 
 
Crime analysts also shared different types of data with their investigators. For example, 
in Avondale they shared information about where crime was occurring in the city, and in 
Glendale they provided information on persons who were suspected or wanted for 
particular crimes. In Peoria and Tolleson, crime analysts stated, they worked with 
detectives to put “pieces of the puzzle together” using any and all data available, to 
provide detectives with information that might help solve a crime or locate a suspect or 
witness.  
 
We asked the crime analysts what information they would like from their own agency’s 
officers and detectives. Three analysts wanted more MO information. Specifically, they 
were interested in data on emerging crime patterns for the purpose of identifying series 
crimes that might be preventable. Some analysts were specific in the types of MO 
information that they wanted, and they wanted officers and detectives to report not only 
what they found, but also what they did not find. Two analysts commented that they 
wanted more of the information obtainable through Field Interview (FI) cards such as 
suspect names, physical descriptions, known associates, vehicles, and last known 
addresses. One crime analyst stated that he simply wanted officers to fill out the existing 
forms properly and to include all information requested by the department. 
 
Homeland Security 
 
We asked the crime analysts to describe the software applications or analytic methods 
that they would find most useful for terrorism prevention. Most were uncomfortable 
answering this question due to lack of familiarity with data issues and needs pertaining to 
homeland security. Two analysts stated that the question was not applicable in their 
positions within the police agency. The remaining analysts did not respond by naming 
specific software programs, but stated that person data would be useful for terrorism 
prevention. They explained that data on traffic stops and field interviews and other 
general intelligence helped them assess high-risk, violent persons who might have the 
capacity to engage in activities that would threaten the community. These analysts 
explained that it would be helpful to know about such high-risk individuals’ 
identification, vehicles, places of residence, and access to weapons and explosives.  
 
One of the crime analysts believed that it would be helpful for officers to have access to 
Crime Capture. This is a program provided through the Department of Public Safety that 
allows agencies access, using a dummy terminal, to booking photos and driver’s license 
data. At this time, the crime analyst stated, this information is not available to officers in 
the field, but it is desperately needed. One other crime analyst believed that I2 would be 
helpful for agencies sharing social network data across jurisdictions. He cited as an 
example being able to use field interview data or data derived from the soon-to-be-
unveiled Gang-net program to better identify and assess threats from criminal 
organizations. 
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Phoenix and Chandler Focus Group Summary 
 
Interviews with crime analysts in both Phoenix and Chandler suggested that West Valley 
police agencies had much more in common with Chandler than with Phoenix with respect 
to the crime analysts’ functions. Interview data obtained from the Chandler crime analyst 
suggested few differences between Chandler and the model West Valley police agency. 
On the other hand, the Phoenix crime analyst indicated that her unit had substantially 
more resources than West Valley agencies or Chandler with respect to personnel, 
equipment, software, and data available for analysis. Phoenix also reported having greater 
ability to share information than any other agency studied, due to its many formal data-
sharing arrangements such as COPLINK, PACE, VICAP, NIBRS, and Crystal.  
 
Interview data suggested that both Phoenix and Chandler had data that were at least as 
valid and reliable as that of the West Valley agencies, but we found that it takes 
substantially longer for information to become available in Phoenix than at any other 
agency interviewed for this project. The comparison agencies’ analysts cited the same 
concerns as the West Valley analysts with respect to needing additional modus operandi 
(MO) data to help identify crime series. Both Phoenix and Chandler crime analysts stated 
that they would like to be able to share person data with other agencies across the Valley, 
particularly for those persons previously involved in the criminal justice system. Phoenix 
also reported a need for information related to calls for service, field interviews, citations, 
and persons and places involved in incidents. 
 
Major Findings: Crime Analysts 
 
• Six of the ten agencies had a crime analyst. 
• Most crime analysts had access only to data obtained through their CAD/RMS 
systems. 
• Crime analysts most often used Microsoft Access and Excel for analytic purposes. 
• All analysts but one had access to their city’s GIS department. 
• All analysts but one used or had access to ESRI products. 
• Crime analysts generally believed that their CAD/RMS data were reliable and 
valid. 
• The most commonly cited problem data were related to modus operandi (MO); 
the next most commonly cited problem was officers failing to correct erroneous 
dispatch data. 
• A clear relationship existed between the size of an agency and the period of time 
within which data were entered into the department's information systems, with 
smaller departments being faster than larger agencies. 
• West Valley crime analysts shared information ad hoc. 
• All crime analysts stated that person data were the most needed, followed by MO 
and address-level data. 
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Section VI:  Records Management and Communication Supervisors 
 
Information Infrastructure 
 
An underlying premise of the West Valley Information Sharing Enterprise (WISE) is that 
the data-sharing framework must be able to use data provided by each city’s current 
Records Management System (RMS) and Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) systems. We 
found that each agency involved uses a computer-based RMS; eight of the ten agencies 
have a CAD system. However, as stated in the Scope of Work, agencies have acquired 
different proprietary systems or have developed them in-house. Table 4 lists the types of 
systems currently in use by each of the study agencies.  
 
Table 4: Information Infrastructures for West Valley Agencies   
Agency CAD RMS Operating System 
 
AVONDALE Spillman1 Spillman1 Unix 
BUCKEYE Spillman1 Spillman1 Unix 
EL MIRAGE CISCO2 CAD CISCO2 CAPS Windows 
GLENDALE  CHIPS3 (In-House) CHIPS3 (In-House) Oracle 
GOODYEAR NWS4, Aegis CAD NWS4, Aegis RMS Windows 
PEORIA  Sungard H.T.E. Sungard H.T.E. CR Series AS 400 
SURPRISE Spillman1 Spillman1 AIX 
TOLLESON Spillman1 Spillman1 Unix7
WICKENBURG None5 LEADS DOS 
YOUNGTOWN None6 Xpediter Windows 
  
1 Spillman offers a multi-platform application that runs on Microsoft Windows®  HP UX®, AIX®, and Sun Solaris™ 
operating systems. 
2 CISCO – Creative Information Systems Company. 
3 CHIPS – Computer Handled incident Reporting System. 
4 NWS – New World Systems. 
5 Wickenburg relies on hand-written tallies. 
6 Youngtown relies on El Mirage for call dispatch. 
7 Tolleson relies on Buckeye’s server. 
 
Records management representatives from Surprise, Avondale, and Tolleson indicated 
that their agencies relied on software products from Spillman Corporation for managing 
their CAD/RMS systems. The Peoria Police Department relies on an HTE software 
package from SunGard Corporation. Goodyear Police Department uses a New World 
System software, a Windows-based product that they said was similar to Spillman’s. 
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Finally, El Mirage relies on software developed by Creative Information Systems 
(CISCO) for their integrated CAD/RMS, another Windows-based product.  
 
The Glendale Police Department is the only agency that developed its own software to 
manage CAD and RMS. Its RMS is called CHIPS (Computer Handled Incident Program 
System); the CAD system is simply referred to as “CAD.” Both were developed by the 
city’s IT section in 1985.  
 
CAD/RMS systems for all of the interviewed agencies were supported by city 
information technology (IT) departments, with the exceptions of the Goodyear Police 
Department, where CAD/RMS is managed by the city telecommunications department, 
and Surprise, where the police department manages CAD/RMS and the city’s IT and 
telecommunications department provides network support. 
 
The four agencies that relied on the Spillman software gave it mixed reviews. Smaller 
agencies appreciated its ease-of-use and customer support. All agencies were looking 
forward to being able to share and query the databases of other Spillman-based agencies 
to obtain information about people, vehicles, property, warrants, and incidents, but some 
concerns were expressed about the limits of the canned reports and the scalability of the 
software to meet the anticipated rapid population growth. However, each agency had 
recently acquired the software and none was planning to change. 
 
Likewise, Goodyear had acquired the New World Systems software 2 years ago and is in 
the process of bringing it fully online. El Mirage stated that they were planning to 
upgrade their CISCO system during the next fiscal year to include a GUI interface on 
laptops in the field. Both Goodyear and El Mirage managers stated that a key feature of 
their systems was the integration of the statewide CJIS system with the software interface 
delivered in the cars. Goodyear has this capacity currently, and El Mirage is working 
toward it. 
 
Glendale IT staff stated that within the next 5 years, they would be exploring options for 
a new CAD and RMS system since support for the Oracle product was ending. Peoria IT 
staff stated that although they anticipated a change from their HTE system, this would not 
occur for some time. Peoria interviewees said that the AS400’s reliability was a key 
reason for keeping the HTE system for the next few years, while the city absorbs other 
extensive IT changes. 
 
Youngtown and Wickenburg both expressed the desire to upgrade RMS systems, but 
noted that financial constraints and lack of IT support were preventing them from 
exploring options at present. In summary, as anticipated, any data-sharing effort would 
rely on these existing data infrastructures to share the “strands of similar data.” 
 
Data Integrity 
 
As the Scope of Work states, vast amounts of data are collected by law enforcement 
agencies. Police gather data on people, places, and vehicles, among other things, in just 
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about every contact they make within the community. The question is: How timely, 
complete, and comprehensive are these data -- how good are they? To answer this 
question, we asked records management supervisors and communications supervisors a 
series of questions about who enters data, and their timeliness and accuracy.  
 
We learned that data collection, timeliness, and integrity vary considerably across the 
West Valley agencies. Table 5 provides an overview of how incident reports are 
processed. We learned that in three jurisdictions, officers complete their reports using 
laptops or MDTs in their cars, while officers in three other jurisdictions complete their 
reports using computers located at their stations or substations. In five of the agencies, 
officers may hand-write reports, after which records or administrative staff will enter the 
information into databases. In one agency, Glendale, officers may dictate their reports for 
system entry by records staff. 
 
Table 5: Data and Report Entry by Department1   
Agency Where Incident Report Entered by Officers Report Entry Entry Backlog 
AVONDALE Laptop in Car Officer None 
BUCKEYE 
At Station;  
Handwritten 
Officer; 
Civilian in Records Division 
Up to a week 
EL MIRAGE At Station Officer Up to a week 
GLENDALE  
Handwritten;  
Dictated 
Civilian in Records Division Up to 3 weeks 
GOODYEAR Laptop in Car Officer None 
PEORIA  
30-50% Handwritten;  
50-80% Laptop in Car 
Civilian in Records Division Up to 2 months 
SURPRISE Laptop in Car Officer None 
TOLLESON 
Handwritten;  
Typed Narratives 
Administrative Civilian None 
WICKENBURG Handwritten Administrative Civilian None 
YOUNGTOWN At Station Administrative Civilian None 
  
1 Tabular data represent primary methods for data entry reported by an agency. 
 
Most indicated that data entry was fairly timely, and they made references to policies that 
required reports to be entered into their department’s information systems within a brief 
period. As with the crime analysts, the records managers’ results showed a clear 
relationship between agency size and the length of time it took to enter data into the 
information systems.  
 
We explored how compatible, comprehensive, and accurate the data were when entered. 
Most agencies felt that data collected through their CAD and RMS systems ranged from 
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fairly accurate to quite accurate. All of the communication staff were confident about the 
accuracy of their CAD data because certain fields were automatically population with 
system data on times, phone numbers, and addresses from the Maricopa 911 geo-coded 
data files. Most felt their agencies’ officers were aware of the importance of calling in the 
information during incidents to provide accurate response-time data. 
 
We found that their confidence in RMS data was somewhat related to who entered the 
data and how many different people were involved. In three of the smaller agencies, a 
single person was responsible for most data entry, reducing the likelihood of 
interpretation errors or miscoding. These agencies expressed the highest levels of 
confidence in their data. One of the agencies made it a policy that officers would not 
enter data. Staff stated, “The minute that they [officers] start trying to enter data, then 
their functionality becomes that of a data entry person and not a sworn police officer that 
should be out in the community, visible and patrolling.” Agencies with officers 
responsible for data entry reported that they relied on edit checks built into the reporting 
systems along with supervisory oversight to ensure accurate data; however, these 
agencies also engaged in systematic data cleaning efforts, especially for older data.  
 
Records staff indicated that entering data from forms was not difficult for them. Problems 
with data entry when officers used the Spillman system were attributed to lack of training 
and/or of comprehensive system edit checks. The systems, although flexible, allowed 
officers to incorrectly enter key data, for example, actual incident location. This failure, 
noted by records staff in two departments, complicated the extraction and aggregation of 
data. One agency reported significant problems with its data, stating that it was engaged 
in a major data cleaning and retraining effort. The smaller communities noted system 
difficulties with their RMSs. In Youngtown, if more than two individuals attempted 
simultaneously to access the RMS, the system would lock up and crash. In Wickenburg, 
the system often crashed, even though only one person used it.  
 
All agencies reported that they maintained written data entry policies and procedures to 
guide reporting. In most cases, the policies were recorded as sections within the standard 
operating procedures. Interviewees most often indicated that their policy manuals were 
lengthy, filling multiple notebooks or stored electronically on CDs. In some cases, 
interviewees indicated that their policies were general in nature; others said their records 
policies were quite detailed, to the extent of specifying all capital letters for report fields, 
how apartments are coded, and how address fields were to be written. Records and 
communication staff indicated that policies and procedures were regularly updated and 
updates were often distributed by e-mail. 
 
With respect to forms, the interviewees said the booking or arrest form is standardized for 
the entire county. However, each agency has its own incident reporting form. As a result, 
sharing incident and field interview data is complicated; the forms lack any kind of 
standardization. One interviewee stated that “the state of Arizona is coordinating some 
initiative to standardize forms across the entire state, but it is not clear that the initiative is 
succeeding, as every agency is somewhat wedded to their own forms.” 
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Sharing Information with the Other Departments 
 
Records and communication staff indicated that they shared information with other 
departments as requests were received. When a request was received from another law 
enforcement agency, the records clerk would verify identity by requesting a badge or ORI 
number, and checking the e-mail address or fax number from the requesting person. 
When the identity of the requestor was confirmed, the clerk would either mail or fax the 
report or prepare it for pickup by the requesting officer. No West Valley agency reported 
sharing information electronically; they did not have e-mail encryption available. 
(Glendale reported having access to the PACE system to obtain information from 
Phoenix. Peoria is currently in the process of joining COPLINK to obtain access to 
Phoenix data.) 
 
Sharing Information with the Public 
 
Records divisions respond to citizen and business requests for information. We asked 
each department about the types of information requested by and provided to the public. 
To gain a better understanding of the potential for efficiency gains from an integrated 
system, we inquired about the methods used to receive and address public requests. We 
found that most West Valley departments continued to receive requests for information 
through in-person visits, phone contacts, and the mail.  
 
Records staff in every department perceived an increase in requests for information from 
the public, as would be expected given the rapid population increases in many of their 
communities. Interviewees reported that requests were typically insurance-related, such 
as accident reports and theft reports. In addition, a resident sometimes will ask for 
information about neighborhood crime or a problem neighbor. One community reported 
that its department actively participates in community meetings and receives requests 
about specific community crime reports.  
 
Records staff also provide information for media representatives from newspapers, 
television, and radio stations. Finally, records staff field requests for reports and 911 
transcripts from defense attorneys and prosecutors. Glendale reported that it receives as 
many as 600 requests for 911 tapes per year; Peoria noted a slight increase in the number 
of requests for 911 tapes over the past few months.  
 
We asked whether the agencies used Web sites to inform the public and to receive 
information. Most of the agencies reported having at least basic Web sites. Avondale and 
Glendale were in the process of planning or enhancing their sites to include more 
interactive features. We visited their Web sites, and table 6 describes their features.  
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Table 6: Web Sites of the West Valley Police Agencies 
Agency Types of Information Format of Crime Information 
Online 
Reporting 
AVONDALE Static Pages - Descriptions Monthly Crime Reports in PDF No
1
Web site: www.avondale.org/index.asp?NID=78
BUCKEYE Static Pages - Descriptions None No 
Web site: www.buckeyeaz.gov/police/index.htm
EL MIRAGE Static Pages - Descriptions 
Periodic Crime statistics, information about police 
forms and report requests. No 
Web site: www.cityofelmiragepolice.org  (*temporarily not available) 
GLENDALE 
Interactive Pages - 
Police Forms, Reports 
and Hotlines 
Interactive Crime Grid Map that creates table 
"Crimes" in selected grid area; PDF Performance 
Reports; UCR Reports listed but not available 
Yes2
Web site: www.ci.glendale.az.us/police/
GOODYEAR Static Pages - Descriptions None No 
Web site: www.goodyearaz.gov/indexasp?ND=59
PEORIA Static Pages - Crime Analysis Section 
Static Tables for Part 1 through 2005; Interactive 
Calls for service Beat Map 2005 data; Up-to-date 
Burglary Report (PDF) 
No 
Web site: www.peoriaaz.com/index1.htm
SURPRISE Static Pages - Descriptions None No 
Web site: www.surpriseaz.com/index.asp?NIJ=22
TOLLESON Static Pages - Descriptions UCR Reports, Quarterly 2004 No 
Web site: www.tollesonaz.org/index.asp?NID=15
WICKENBURG Static Pages - Descriptions Table 1995-2003 No
1
Web site: www.ci.wickenburg.az.us/index.asp?NID=73
YOUNGTOWN None None No 
Web site: None 
 
1 Printable report request form in PDF format. 
2 Online forms also available for reporting incidents, tips, commendations, and complaints. 
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The Glendale Police Department’s Web site was the most advanced, with an interactive 
crime grid map. When a grid was selected, the site generated a table of crimes that had 
occurred within the specified period in the selected area. The site also had online 
reporting forms for citizens to: 
 
• File an online crime report for theft, vandalism, criminal damage, and/or lost 
property; 
• Request traffic enforcement; 
• Report Glendale Arena traffic complaints; 
• Provide narcotics tips; 
• File a bias or hate crime report; 
• Commend police personnel; and 
• File a citizen’s complaint. 
 
The site provided downloadable PDF files for citizens to make public records requests 
and to apply to the police citizen academy. Avondale and Wickenburg also provided 
downloadable forms on their Web sites for requesting public records.  
 
During our interviews, we learned that West Valley agencies viewed Web sites as a 
valuable resource for interacting with the community. Many of them expressed interest in 
using the Internet to communicate more information to the community. Three records and 
communication staff expressed interest in allowing the public to request and report 
information using their Web sites. However, no department said that improving its Web 
site would be a priority in the next 5 years. Only two agencies mentioned developing a 
Web-based data warehouse as a viable option to support sharing of West Valley data. In 
fact, one agency expressed serious reservations about posting or sharing data across the 
Web, citing security and citizen-privacy concerns. 
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Section VII: Homeland Security Officials 
 
We interviewed command staff who had responsibility for homeland security issues 
within their jurisdictions. In four of five agencies, a supervisor or commander was in 
charge of homeland security issues, among other responsibilities, within his or her 
agency. In one agency, Glendale, a commander served as Director of Homeland Security 
and was the agency’s liaison with ACTIC and other agencies.  
 
We asked these homeland security officials to provide their views on data and 
information sharing. All indicated that they had shared data at one time or another with 
appropriate state and federal agencies (ACTIC and JTTF) when they were asked, 
particularly information regarding critical infrastructures. But they also acknowledged 
that no existing system allows data exchanges to and from their agencies to ACTIC or 
JTTF. One commander indicated that he received e-mail and bulletins from ACTIC, but 
that was the extent of their information sharing.  
 
In the West Valley, these officials thought that their jurisdictions were less likely than 
Phoenix to be targets of terrorism, although they acknowledged that there were potential 
targets in their cities. For example, a nuclear power plant, air force base, and sporting 
arenas all are potential sites for terrorist activity. For the most part, however, they 
believed that they were not at the core of danger. According to one commander, 
 
…where I see [my agency] and the rest of the West Valley agencies are, if 
something’s going to happen, my guess is it will probably happen in Phoenix. 
Now, peripherally, it will shut down, and we will have to assist even Phoenix if 
there was some massive event. We would have things like gas shortages, lines, 
food availability. It would affect all of us in that manner, so none of us will say, 
“Well, that’s in Phoenix, and we’re not going to be affected.” Because I believe 
that it will.  
 
The problem, they said, was that information regarding these types of threats is not 
shared and “that information is secured and hasn’t been shared, and it needs to be placed 
somewhere where people can get access to that in law enforcement.”  
 
In Glendale, a new stadium, currently under construction for the Arizona Cardinals, will 
be the site of the 2008Super Bowl. As a result, there is more concern for terrorism than 
before. The commander in Glendale said, 
 
I would suspect that we would want some way of sharing, allowing those users 
(ACTIC and JTTF) to access our data for the analysis and predicting issues. I 
think that’s the goal, is to somehow design a system for the people that need the 
information, but exclude the people that really don’t need it, that they don’t get it. 
That’s the trick. From the homeland security perspective, in prevention and 
protection portions of homeland security, I would imagine that our agency is 
going to have an intelligence bureau and they will have a special operations 
center. Those folks will probably receive their data at the new emergency 
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operations center, so I think my perspective is more of where the data goes as 
opposed to what types of data it is and those kinds of things. 
 
One commander indicated that he and others obtain and share information at a quarterly 
West Valley tactical commanders meeting. 
 
Commanders mentioned that training has occurred within and among jurisdictions, 
although not on a regular basis. One commander said that a WMD exercise was recently 
conducted; they take these seriously.  
 
Homeland Security in Phoenix 
 
The commander in charge of homeland security in the Phoenix Police Department 
indicated that 30 personnel were assigned to the Homeland Defense Bureau that includes 
state and local personnel. The Phoenix personnel included supervisors, detectives, and 
analysts. Within the Homeland Defense Bureau are two groups: state and local, and the 
Joint Terrorism Task Force. Each group demands top secret or secret clearance levels.  
 
The commander indicated that files and information are governed by the Code of Federal 
Regulations 28 (CFR28) that limits sharing of confidential information. He asked, “We 
have a problem with when we gather intelligence and we have the joint terrorism task 
force guys on the top-secret side getting stuff, how do you take it from there and turn it 
into a criminal case on the other side?”  
 
Sharing information is limited because of security clearances and CFR 28. The 
commander noted, “We are working through some of those issues… we’ve had a couple 
of successful cases we’ve done lately.”  
 
He also indicated that: 
 
…this center has every database in the world up there, and a lot of stuff I don’t 
even know about that is up there, but it’s still picking up a phone that works best. 
We had to invent a program called the Terrorism Liaison Officer Program that 
involves fire fighters and police officers in jurisdictions all around the valley and 
the state that can tie directly into the intel center information center. So, that 
means they can call up there and get anything they want if they have the proper 
clearance. 
 
Major Findings: Homeland Security   
 
• No system currently exists that allows for data exchanges between West Valley 
police agencies and the Arizona Homeland Security Bureau. 
• Information on homeland security issues has been shared by commanders with the 
state, but sparingly. 
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• West Valley commanders acknowledge that they are on the periphery of 
terrorism; they anticipate that Phoenix would be more likely than their 
jurisdictions to be a target. 
• Training has been provided to officers on WMD events, but not on a continuing 
basis. 
• Phoenix has more manpower dedicated to homeland security than the 10 West 
Valley departments combined. 
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Section VIII:  Command Personnel Findings 
 
Perceptions of Data Quality 
 
Most of the chiefs believed that their CAD/RMS data were valid and reliable. They 
explained that their systems were stable and that most of the data were “good.” We asked 
about their perceptions of problems associated with their CAD/RMS data. Four of the 
chiefs explained that there were inconsistencies with the coding of offense data. Many of 
them noted, for example, that a citizen might call the police about a burglary, when in 
fact, after an officer investigates the incident, he or she determines that it was actually a 
theft. The chiefs reported that in these cases, officers often do not call to correct the error 
with  dispatch, and so the offense codes remain incorrect in the CAD/RMS system. Two 
of the chiefs stated that problems with their CAD/RMS systems were restricted to address 
data. They explained that although some officers do not collect information 
systematically, others do not collect the data at all. For instance, some might record 
address-level data by documenting intersections, while others use full addresses, and still 
others might use only business names. They explained that the lack of consistency of 
address-level data makes it difficult to analyze such information accurately.  
 
The chief in El Mirage indicated that his agency’s CAD/RMS system was antiquated. He 
stated that it was primarily used for report writing and report generation, and that it was 
unreliable for any other use. Youngtown reported that it did not have its own CAD/RMS 
system; the agency out-sources this responsibility to El Mirage. The Youngtown chief 
reported that that agency receives regular downloads of CAD/RMS data from El Mirage; 
they use this information for compiling statistics to make presentations to city officials 
and to make personnel-allocation decisions. Buckeye’s chief reported that his CAD/RMS 
system was underdeveloped and that the agency is working with a vendor to train 
personnel to use the system, so that they can better use this information in the future. 
 
Commanders in the West Valley agencies shared the sentiments of their police chiefs 
about data quality. Most believed that their data were valid and reliable. With respect to 
data systems, the supervisor in Wickenburg indicated that they did not have CAD or 
RMS; instead, they rely on handwritten cards for dispatching calls for service, and a 
civilian enters reports into an antiquated database.  
 
Information Use and Availability 
 
We asked all of the police chiefs about the kinds of information and data that they used 
for decision-making. The most common response was CAD/RMS data, followed closely 
by data obtained directly from crime reports or logs. This information was used by the 
chiefs for several operational and administrative purposes. The most common purposes 
were to notify their commanders about crime problems needing their attention and to 
make decisions about personnel allocations to geographic areas with high levels of crime. 
Chiefs in Goodyear and Tolleson also indicated that they used traffic data for this 
purpose.  
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However, interviews with the chiefs indicated that they primarily used departmental data 
to make administrative decisions rather than for decisions directly related to operations. 
Almost all of the chiefs stated that they used CAD/RMS data to justify resources and to 
guide requests for additional personnel and equipment. Two chiefs stated that they used 
CAD data for tracking and evaluating officer activity and productivity; two others 
mentioned that they used complaint and internal affairs data for personnel decisions. 
Likewise, two of the chiefs stated that they spent the majority of their time on personnel 
issues, so they relied heavily on “all data” pertaining to the evaluation of personnel. 
Buckeye’s chief stated that due to a lack of data infrastructure, that agency was required 
to rely heavily on person-to-person or person-to-group conversations to make operational 
and administrative decisions.7
 
We asked the chiefs about the types of information that they most often used from their 
information systems. All of the West Valley chiefs stated that they primarily relied on 
event data obtained through crime reports or their CAD/RMS systems. For example, 
almost all of the chiefs stated that such data were used for the purpose of designing place-
based intervention strategies, such as increasing patrols in known hot spots. They 
explained that they also used this information to identify series patterns for crimes such 
as burglaries, robberies, and auto thefts. If a pattern was identified, the information was 
then used to direct special units or patrols to address the problem.  
 
Commanders use departmental data for allocating personnel and targeting areas of 
criminal behavior. In Avondale, for example, commanders indicated that they used maps 
and calls for service data to target hot spots and to construct the new beat system.  
 
Two of the chiefs stated that they also relied heavily on census data for allocating 
resources. For example, one chief explained that analysis of census data showed that 
some areas of the city were heavily populated with Spanish speakers; he re-allocated his 
Spanish-speaking officers to these areas, increasing the effectiveness of police services. 
Two other chiefs stated that they relied heavily on accident data to determine where 
traffic operations should be deployed. 
 
Of special interest was the finding that half of the chiefs reported that their agencies did 
not have the infrastructure or capacity to map crime within their jurisdictions. These 
agencies tended to be smaller and did not have the financial resources to staff or equip 
this function. However, three of the chiefs reported that their agencies were actively 
involved in crime mapping, and one was in the process of implementing crime mapping 
within the next few months. All three of these agencies used crime mapping for tactical 
and operational purposes. For example, these chiefs stated that crime mapping was 
routinely conducted to identify location-specific crime trends. If a trend or hot spot was 
observed, they used this information to make managers aware of the problem and to 
                                                 
7 During interviews with the chiefs, it became clear that they relied on several sources of information for 
making decisions. All of the chiefs understood that the purpose of this interview was to assess their data 
needs with respect to crime and related problems. Thus, although many of the chiefs did not make mention 
of the vast array of information that they use for decision-making, the omission of such discussion does not 
indicate that they do not use other information. 
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ensure that appropriate resources were being deployed. One of the chiefs used crime 
maps for organizational decisions, as well. This chief used crime mapping to determine 
beat assignments and make budget presentations to the city council. He also reported that 
his agency provided crime maps to citizens to assist them with personal decisions and 
with crime prevention efforts by block watch programs. 
 
Information Needs 
 
We asked West Valley chiefs about the types of information they needed from other 
jurisdictions. Five of the chiefs explained that their agencies needed information from 
other jurisdictions about people who had had prior contact with the criminal justice 
system. They were specifically interested in data pertaining to arrest history and field 
interviews, and in individual’s potential for violence, previous addresses, and vehicles. A 
few chiefs stated that their agencies also needed information pertaining to known 
associates of offenders. These data, they explained, could be obtained through Field 
Interview cards and access to jail visitation rosters. Many of the chiefs noted that one of 
the reasons person data are so important is that individuals who are contacted by the 
police in their jurisdiction are quite often not residents of their city. Thus, field level 
officers are often working without much information that might help with the tactical 
decisions they must make in the field.  
 
Six of the chiefs also stated that they needed modus operandi (MO) information from 
other agencies. They said that many crime series take place across the valley; criminal 
investigators tend to work these crimes independently, without the accumulated 
knowledge of their colleagues across the metropolitan area. An example was a series of 
safe burglaries occurring throughout the Valley. Only recently did investigators across 
departments recognized the regional trend and begin collaborating on investigating these 
cases. Chiefs also voiced a variety of data needs from other jurisdiction, including 
information pertaining to gangs, vehicles, property, and census data. 
 
Commanders agreed with the chiefs that they needed information on arrest histories and 
crime series. The Buckeye commander said, “It would be nice just to get on the computer 
without calling around and just… and it just pops up – yeah, we had contact with him for 
this or whatever. I just think that the ease and the availability of information on different 
people will be just great.” 
 
Homeland Security Information Sharing 
 
We asked West Valley chiefs about the extent to which they currently share information 
related to homeland security and about their agencies’ homeland security information 
needs. Our interviews suggested that sharing information related to homeland security 
was restricted to agency participation in the Arizona Counter-Terrorism Information 
Center (ACTIC). Four chiefs stated that their agencies participated in ACTIC, either 
directly or indirectly, for the specific purpose of sharing information about threats related 
to homeland security. Two of the chiefs (Glendale, Peoria) indicated that they had 
allocated permanent personnel to ACTIC; two stated that their agencies did not have their 
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own personnel assigned to ACTIC, but they relied on a representative from another 
agency. For example, Youngtown relied on an ACTIC representative from the Peoria 
Police Department and El Mirage relied on a representative from the Maricopa County 
Sheriff’s Office to retrieve and provide this information the agency. Three chiefs gave 
specific examples of the types of information that they share with ACTIC. Two stated 
that they had contacted ACTIC about stolen police uniforms and badges, providing the 
information to their ACTIC representatives, who in turn provided it to ACTIC. Another 
chief explained that some of his officers had observed two individuals photographing 
airplanes at the local airport with sophisticated equipment. The officers obtained 
identifying information on the persons and forwarded it to ACTIC. 
 
All of the chiefs agreed that their agencies needed information pertaining to homeland 
security threats. Four chiefs stated that they needed information pertaining to persons and 
groups that have potential to engage in crime or terrorism within their local jurisdictions, 
giving as examples gangs, gang members, immigrants, and potential terrorists. These 
chiefs were clear that although most of the information forwarded by federal agencies 
was interesting, they did not want or need generic information about potential threats, but 
rather needed specific information on persons of interest or potential locations that might 
be threatened within their communities. Two chiefs pointed out that critical 
infrastructures were located either within their jurisdictions or nearby. These chiefs stated 
that the proximity to critical infrastructures causes them to need information about crime 
in the areas surrounding that infrastructure and intelligence on threats to it. Three of the 
chiefs also stated a need for general information pertaining to trends, potential threats, 
and critical infrastructures within their jurisdictions.  
 
Perceived Challenges to Regional Data Sharing 
 
Near the conclusion of the interview, we asked the chiefs about obstacles they saw in 
regional data sharing. Five of the chiefs believed that the cost of implementing an 
information-sharing system could be a deterrent to some agencies. They noted that many 
of the agencies in the West Valley are small and do not have adequate resources 
(personnel and money) to invest in such a major undertaking. Other chiefs pointed out 
that some West Valley police agencies have already committed to costly information 
systems, so they might not want to spend additional monies on yet another one. 
 
Five chiefs believed that there might be administrative problems with the development of 
a regional data-sharing initiative. These chiefs stated that many issues will need to be 
discussed before such an initiative could begin, and that friction between the agencies 
could stall such a project. For example, they cited a need for dialogue about issues 
connected with data management, data security, data ownership, data quality control, 
system maintenance, training requirements, and memoranda of understanding, any of 
which, if not handled delicately, could derail the project. About one third of the chiefs 
mentioned that for the initiative to succeed, agencies would need to move forward while 
recognizing the delicacy of relationships, understanding that trust and strong relationships 
would be central to the project’s success. A few of the chiefs also mentioned that some 
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information technology personnel, as well as some police managers, are territorial with 
respect to their data and may be reluctant to share information.  
 
Three commanders indicated that turf battles among some agencies might hinder the 
ability to share information, but they also said that the smaller departments recognize the 
need to share because they lack resources to deal independently with information-related 
problems. One commander mentioned that some people “think their information is top 
secret and they are not willing to share.” The same commander also said that “the large 
agencies were the ‘worst’ in terms of providing information…that it’s really, really, 
really difficult.” 
 
A commander in Glendale said that one of the barriers to data sharing is that lack of 
standardized terminology. He mentioned that definitions vary across departments for 
different data elements. He said that “it’s hard to move the data if we don’t have a 
common name for something.”     
 
We asked the chiefs where within their own agencies they might have problems with the 
implementation of a data-sharing initiative. Without exception, chiefs indicated that this 
would not be an issue, and that as far as they were concerned, there would be no 
problems with the implementation of the West Valley data-sharing initiative. Almost all 
of the responses were similar to the following: “Absolutely not. We would welcome it. 
We want to be able to query other agencies reports. Our patrol guys need it the most. It is 
good for officer safety and crime fighting.” Another chief similarly stated, “None. My 
department is ready and waiting, and we want to move forward.” All of the chiefs 
expressed the desire to participate in the initiative and stated that they would work to 
resolve problems as they arose. They all emphasized that it is imperative that the data 
initiative move forward and that they would strongly support it in any way that they 
could. 
 
Major Findings: Command Personnel 
 
• Most of the chiefs and commanders believe that their CAD/RMS data is valid and 
reliable. However, four of the chiefs explained that there were inconsistencies 
with the coding of offense data.  
• The most common type of data the chiefs and commanders rely on to make 
decisions is CAD/RMS data, followed closely by data obtained directly from 
crime reports or logs. 
• Interviews with the chiefs indicated that they use departmental data and 
information primarily for the purpose of making administrative decisions rather 
than for making decisions related to operations.  
• Half of the chiefs indicated that their agencies did not have the infrastructure or 
capacity to map crime within their jurisdictions. 
• Chiefs stated that they most needed modus operandi (MO) information from other 
agencies, followed closely by information on people who had had prior contact 
with the criminal justice system.  
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• Commanders need arrest histories and information on crime series in the West 
Valley. 
• Half of the chiefs believe that the cost of implementing an information-sharing 
system could be a deterrent.  
• Half believe that there might be administrative or management problems with the 
development of a regional data-sharing initiative that could cause problems with 
project implementation. 
• Some commanders believe that turf battles could hinder data sharing. 
• All of the chiefs stated that it is imperative that the data initiative move forward 
and that they would strongly support it in any way that they could. 
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Section IX:  Web Sites 
 
We reviewed 47 Arizona agency Web sites that were identified on the Arizona 
Department of Public Safety’s Web site (www.azdps.gov/information/default.asp), 69 
Web site applications that were listed as potential solutions in the needs assessment 
Scope of Work, and 27 information-sharing projects profiled on the Web site for Search, 
Inc. (www.search.org/programs/info/resources.asp).  
 
Of the 47 Arizona agency sites (listed in Appendix B: Reviewed Web Sites – Arizona):  
 
• 74% were primarily static information or brochure-like Web sites.  
• 51% provided data on crime statistics, although several had data that was at least 
a year old.  
• 15% provided crime maps, four of which were interactive and dynamic. 
• 21% provided access to an online form of some type. Some of these were 
downloadable PDF forms to complete and submit by mail or in person; others 
could be completed online and submitted electronically. 
 
Two sites were notable and should be considered for the WISE effort. One provides data 
for multiple locations in a dynamic (data-driven) manner. The Tempe Web site provided 
a link to another site, www.azcentral.com, where users can search for crimes reported in 
the Phoenix area by city and zip code. This media-based site provides pinmaps for 
Chandler, Gilbert, Glendale, Mesa, Peoria, Phoenix, and Tempe. Users can limit the 
search to a time period: the prior month, 3 months, 6 months, or year. The pins on the 
maps identify incidents as violent, property, or “other” crimes, and indicate the block of 
the incident. Users can also list the data shown on the map. 
 
A second site, the Chandler Police Department Web site, allows the public to obtain 
police records online. In our interview with the Chandler records staff, we learned that 
Chandler has outsourced this service to a private company. The company provides 
redaction of information services and a way for members of the public to receive copies 
of their police reports online, freeing police personnel time.  
 
A review of the other 69 Web site applications (see Appendix B: Reviewed Web Sites – 
National) yielded that: 
 
• 23% of the Web sites have interactive, dynamic geographic information 
applications. 
• 9% have data on calls for service. 
• 57% have data on reported crimes. 
• 10% have data on persons of interest. 
The Web sites most relevant to this effort were those that supported interagency sharing. 
The Automated Regional Justice Information System (ARJIS at www.arjis.org) is “a 
complex criminal justice enterprise network utilized by 50 local, state and federal 
agencies in the San Diego region.” According to information on the site, it includes a 
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secure intranet that “contains data on the region’s crime cases, arrests, citations, field 
interviews, traffic accidents, fraudulent documents, photographs, gang information and 
stolen property.” It provides a “single point of entry to query all regional justice data” and 
is used for tactical analysis, investigations, statistical research, and crime analysis. From a 
public view, it allows for the dynamic generation of maps and lists about crime problems 
for 18 cities and San Diego County, as well as for numerous neighborhoods, police beats, 
council districts, and other geographic areas. The East Valley Compass project at 
www.citizencompass.org/compass/, involving 10 California East Valley cities, is similar 
that of ARJIS.  
From the Search, Inc. section on local profiles, we learned that many communities are 
engaged in strategic planning to develop interagency criminal justice systems. However, 
many of these efforts are focused on sharing information across the system among  
police, prosecutors, courts, and corrections, rather than among police agencies. Of 
particular interest to the West Valley effort is the Maricopa County Integrated Criminal 
Justice Information System (ICJIS). Its purpose is to facilitate the integration of 
information systems among the criminal justice agencies of Maricopa County. It is led by 
a coalition of five primary criminal justice agencies within Maricopa County: the 
Sheriff's Office, the prosecutor (County Attorney), indigent representation agencies 
(Public Defender, Legal Defender, Office of Legal Advocate, and Office of Contract 
Counsel), the Clerk of the Court, and the court system (Superior Court, Adult Probation, 
Juvenile Probation, Justice Courts, and Pretrial Services). A bi-annual strategic business 
plan was approved by participants in April 2005.  
Other ongoing efforts similar to the West Valley project were the Texas Urban Counties 
Common Integrated Justice System and the Shield plan. The Texas effort involves 13 
urban counties and is focused on cost reduction and standardized work products. As of 
2003, they were in the process of selecting a vendor to build the system. The Shield 
project involved three metropolitan areas: New York City, the National Capitol Area (the 
District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia), and Pennsylvania. It sought to 
demonstrate real-time sharing of public safety, law enforcement, and justice information 
across jurisdictions to help protect our nation against terrorist attacks and to enhance law 
enforcement nationwide. As of September 2003, this effort was seeking to link the 
partners’ existing local data-sharing networks into a multi-jurisdictional network across a 
secure Internet connection. 
 
In summary, our review of Web sites found that the criminal justice field is just 
beginning to embrace Web-based technologies. Few models for creating a cross-
jurisdictional data warehouse exist. The West Valley partners are poised to be one of the 
first groups to create a model for effectively sharing information.  
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Section X:  Conclusions 
 
This needs assessment has four major objectives: 
 
1. Define the current technological environment within the West Valley. 
2. Define how technology is used or consumed within the West Valley. 
3. Identify current and future data-sharing needs of police agencies. 
4. Determine whether there are any obstacles to regional information sharing within 
the West Valley. 
 
To accomplish these objectives, we conducted extensive interviews with nearly 240 
members of the 10 West Valley, Phoenix, and Chandler police departments. We also 
examined population forecasts, socio-demographic information, and crime data 
associated with each of these agencies. We reviewed the Web sites of 47 Arizona police 
agencies, 65 Web-based information-sharing projects from across the country, and 27 
other state and local information-sharing projects identified by Search, Inc. From this 
information we learned the following. 
 
Existing Technological Infrastructure 
• Technological resources are severely limited in some agencies, but in others, 
potential for growth mirrors future population increases. 
• Technology (hardware and software) for information sharing varies in 
sophistication within the West Valley. Wickenburg, for example, has no CAD, 
RMS or MDCs in patrol cars. At the other end of the spectrum is Glendale which 
has CAD, RMS, MDCs, GIS, an interactive Web site, and a crime analyst.  
• Some West Valley agencies are or will be able to share information through their 
current systems. For example, El Mirage currently supports Youngtown through 
its CAD system. Four agencies, Avondale, Buckeye, Surprise, and Tolleson, are 
on the cusp of sharing information because all use the Spillman system. Glendale 
is able to obtain information from Phoenix through PACE, and Peoria will soon 
be able to share information with Phoenix through COPLINK.  
• Eight of the 10 West Valley agencies have recently acquired or updated their 
CAD/RMS systems. Many are still in the process of converting data and bringing 
the systems to full operational capacity. Glendale plans to upgrade its CAD/RMS 
over the next 5 years.  
• No police department in the West Valley has an existing system readily capable 
of collecting, evaluating, analyzing, and distributing information and knowledge 
in an efficient and user-friendly manner to all of the involved agencies. 
 
Identified Technology Needs 
• Patrol officers in El Mirage, Youngtown, and presumably Wickenburg expressed 
a need for MDCs in their cars. 
• Investigators expressed a need for MDCs in their vehicles throughout the West 
Valley. 
• Youngtown and Wickenburg sought basic technology (e.g., CAD, RMS) for their 
agencies. 
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• Half of the chiefs and commanders sought mapping capabilities for their agencies.  
 
Identified Data Needs 
• Patrol officers and investigators want direct access to data about persons, 
including an individual’s prior contact with police, criminal history, Field 
Interview cards, photograph, aliases, associates, addresses, and outstanding 
warrants.  
• Patrol officers want access to Attempt to Locate suspect and vehicle information, 
and knowledge about ongoing investigations.  
• Investigators want information derived from Field Interview cards, access to 
crime trend data from neighboring jurisdictions, and access to internal and 
interagency RMS data in the field. 
• Patrol officers and investigators both sought additional information from crime 
analysts including mapping, crime trends, hot spots, and predictive information. 
• Chiefs and commanders supported their officers’ requests for modus operandi 
information and person data. 
• Crime analysts indicated that person data, modus operandi information, and 
address-level data were most needed.  
 
Obstacles to Regional Information Sharing 
• MO data was found to be unreliable and not valid in most of the study agencies. 
• At least half of the agencies do not have the capacity to engage in place-based 
(address-level) analysis. 
• The cost of implementing an information-sharing system could be a deterrent for 
some agencies to participate fully in WISE. 
• Administrative and management problems with the development of a regional 
data-sharing initiative could cause difficulties with project implementation. 
• Issues of data management, data security, data ownership, quality control, system 
maintenance, standardization of terminology, and training requirements need to 
be discussed or they could derail the sharing of information. 
• Turf battles among all levels of personnel could hinder data sharing. 
• Some West Valley police agencies have already committed to costly information 
systems, so they might not want to spend additional monies on yet another 
information system. 
 
Other Important Findings 
• The population of the 10 West Valley jurisdictions will increase by at least 31% 
from 2005 (625,440) to 2010 (817,300). If prognosticators are correct, then 
Buckeye will triple in size and Goodyear and Surprise will see increases close to 
50%. 
 
• All of the police chiefs in the West Valley feel that it is imperative that the data 
initiative move forward and would strongly support it in any way that they could. 
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Section XI:  Recommendations 
 
The findings and conclusions of this study illustrate the diversity of the West Valley 
police departments with respect to technology use, data needs, size, and growth. Some 
agencies need more technology than others, but many of them do not have the resources 
to obtain it. Some agencies are confronting phenomenal growth within the next few 
years. How will they keep pace with a growing population and a growing department, 
and anticipate the information needs of their officers while working with nine other 
agencies? How does WISE balance the needs of the smaller agencies with those of the 
larger ones? How does the group determine the direction of the data-sharing effort? In 
addition to these issues, obstacles to regional information sharing must be short-circuited 
before they emerge to overwhelm the project. What are the best methods for doing this? 
The good news is that police chiefs in the West Valley are behind the initiative and are 
willing to provide support for its furtherance.  
 
Recommendations 
At the conclusion of this needs assessment, based on our findings, we recommend the 
following steps: 
 
1. Create a governance structure to assure the success of the project. This should 
include representation and leadership from the West Valley Chiefs of Police. We 
recommend that the committee serve as a subcommittee for the Far West Valley 
Chiefs Association to provide oversight and guidance for the WISE effort.  
 
2. The subcommittee from the West Valley Chiefs Association should select a 
project manager for the WISE initiative. It is recommended that this person be 
independent of West Valley police agencies so that he or she can offer 
independent and unbiased advice and direction. The project manager should be 
responsible for guiding the strategic planning process, identifying money to 
implement the WISE project, serving as liaison between the West Valley Chiefs 
of Police and the WISE subcommittee, and for implementing the project. 
 
3. Create a team or subcommittee from within WISE to initiate a strategic planning 
process that will lead to the implementation of a West Valley-wide system and 
intelligence-led policing efforts. This team would develop a strategic plan, based 
upon the needs assessment, to bring to the WISE group for feedback and 
approval. As noted previously, the strategic plan should have as a primary focus 
the sharing of person-level data.  
 
4. A written statement about the West Valley effort thus far to create an information-
sharing initiative should be distributed to the public through local newspapers and 
television stations. This not only will foster legitimacy for the West Valley 
agencies and their chiefs, but it will convey information to other Maricopa County 
law enforcement agencies about the growing organizational capacity and strength 
of the West Valley. 
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5. Create an external advisory board. The board should be comprised of individuals 
who have played a primary role in the creation of data-sharing projects within 
their jurisdictions. This group will be able to provide WISE with valuable 
experiential advice on how to proceed and how to address obstacles.  
 
Recommended Next Steps 
• Hire a project manager who is independent of West Valley police agencies. 
• Develop a preliminary strategic plan for implementing the WISE project. 
o Assign individuals from the WISE committee to a subcommittee for 
accomplishing this task. 
• Determine the timeline for the above two action steps. 
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Appendix A 
 
Interview Instruments 
 
 
 
Patrol Instrument 
 
1. What IT equipment do you currently have available? 
2. Do you feel comfortable getting information from your system?   
3. What specific information (i.e., people, places, property) can you obtain from 
your system? 
4. What information or resources do you have available in the office that are not 
available in the field? 
5. Is there information that you would like, but do not currently have available in the 
field? 
6. What information do you share with other officers and detectives within your own 
agency? 
7. What information do you want from other officers and detectives within your own 
agency? 
8. What information do you share with other jurisdictions? 
9. What information do you want from other jurisdictions? 
10. What information do you want from your crime analysts? 
11. Have you received any training on responding to major incidents, for example, a 
natural or man-made disaster? If “yes,” how much and what kind of training? 
12. What information do you think would be important for you to respond to a major 
incident, for example, a natural or man-made disaster? 
13. If you had to select just one piece of information or data, or a resource that you do 
not currently have available, what would you want? 
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Investigator Instrument 
 
1. What IT equipment do you have available? 
2. Do you feel comfortable getting information from your system? 
3. What specific information (i.e., people, places, property, autos, mug shots) can 
you obtain from your system? 
4. Is there information (i.e., people, places, property, autos, mug shots) that you 
would like, but do not currently have available to you in the field? 
5. What information do you share with other officers and detectives in your agency? 
6. What information do you want from other officers and detectives in your agency? 
7. What information do you share with other jurisdictions? 
8. What information do you want from other jurisdiction? 
9. What information do you want from your crime analysts? 
10. Do you have any unit-based databases? (What is in them, specifically?) 
11. Are you willing to share these databases with other personnel in or out of your 
agency? 
12. Have you received any training on responding to major incidents, for example, a 
natural or man-made disaster? If “yes,” how much and what kind of training? 
13. What information do you think would be important in order for you to respond to 
a major incident, for example, a natural or man-made disaster? 
14. If you had to select just one piece of information or data, or a resource that you do 
not currently have available to you, what would you want? 
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Crime Analyst Instrument 
 
1. What kind of data do you use for analysis? 
2. What software applications do you currently use for data sharing and/or terrorism 
prevention? 
3. What software applications or analytical methods would be most useful for 
terrorism prevention? 
4. Does the city have a GIS department and do you have access to it? 
5. Do you use GIS? What software? Which version? 
6. What data collection software do you use (CAD, RMS, others)?  
7. How reliable, valid, and timely do you think your data are? 
8. What piece of information is most neglected on reports? 
9. What analytic software do you use (Access, GIS, Excel, other)? 
10. What information (i.e., people, places, property, autos, mug shots) do you most 
often use from your systems?    
11. Is there information (i.e., people, places, property, autos) that you would like but 
do not currently have available in the field?  
12. What is the most applicable or useful software for sharing information across 
jurisdictions? 
13. What information do you share with other jurisdictions?  
14. What information do you want from other jurisdiction? 
15. What information do you share with other officers and detectives? 
16. What information do you want from other officers and detectives, and what would 
that be? 
17. Who supports your CAD and RMS system? 
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CAD/RMS System Administrator Instrument 
 
1. Who do you report to? 
2. Describe your system or network and its capabilities? 
3. How do you support your police agency? 
4. What kind of support would you be able to provide to the West Valley data-
sharing initiative? 
5. How reliable, valid, and timely do you think your data are? 
6. Policies and procedures to data entry and changes, query? 
7. What security requirements do you have for sharing information within and 
across departments? 
8. What big initiatives do you have going in the next 5 years? 
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Records and Communications Instrument 
 
1. Show me the forms you guys enter. 
2. How difficult is it for you to enter your data? What problems do you have? 
3. What kind of backlog do you have? 
4. How reliable, valid, and timely do you think your data is? 
5. Where are your quality control checks? 
6. Who do you routinely share data with? 
7. Show me your policies and procedures for data entry. 
8. What does the public ask for most often? How hard is it to provide to them? 
9. What information do you regularly provide to the public? 
10. Do you charge a fee for records to the public? 
11. What is your view of allowing access to info on a Web-based system? 
12. Do you think that you would save any time by providing this information on a 
Web-based system? 
13. What information do you regularly provide to officers or other officials? 
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Chiefs, Senior Executive, and Homeland Security Personnel Instrument 
 
1. What reporting mechanisms do you currently use for data sharing and/or 
homeland security? 
2. What is your agency’s crime mapping capability and how do you use it? 
3. How reliable, valid, and timely do you think your CAD/RMS data is? 
4. What kind of information/data do you use for decision-making? 
5. What information do you need for homeland security? 
6. Are there any data that you are sharing with regard to homeland security 
regionally, county-wide, or state-wide? 
7. Where is the data that you are sharing coming from? 
8. What information do you need from other jurisdictions? 
9. What information (i.e., people, places, property, autos, mug shots) do you most 
often use from your systems? 
10. Is there any other information that you would like, but do not currently have 
available to you? 
11. What obstacles do you see in regional data sharing? 
12. Where within your agency do your think you might have problems with the 
implementation of a data-sharing initiative? 
 
 Appendix B 
 
Reviewed Web Sites - National 
 
 
Jurisdiction St Web Address Description Of Site Contents Notable 
Sites 
Calls for 
service 
Reported 
Crimes 
Persons 
Mesa AZ 
http://www.ci.mesa.
az.us/police/crime_
analysis/maps/mes
a_city_map_district
s.asp 
Interactive of department districts. Map 
is linked to beat stats from Oct-Dec '05 
and residential burglary and stolen 
vehicle locations, all in PDF format.    √     
Scottsdale AZ 
http://eservices.sco
ttsdaleaz.gov/cosm
ap/crimes/default.a
sp 
Interactive pinmap w/ location, type, 
and date of crime. Up-to-date within the 
last 6 months.  √   √   
South Tucson AZ 
http://www.southtuc
sonpolice.com/GISi
ntro.html 
Out-of-date maps containing location of 
Part 1 offenses.     √   
Tempe AZ 
http://www.tempe.g
ov/cau/crime_analy
sis_maps.htm 
Interactive map of department beats. 
Also contains limited (totals only) up-to-
date crime data.      √   
Berkeley CA 
http://www.ci.berkel
ey.ca.us/police/crim
estats/crimestatma
p.html 
Interactive Pin District map linked to 
limited (totals) out of date Part 1 
offenses data.     √   
Corona CA 
http://www.discover
corona.com/depts/p
d/crimestats.cfm 
Semi-interactive with "Zone" (district) 
map and limited (totals) crime data in 
the form of a bar graph.     √   
Daly City CA 
http://www.ci.daly-
city.ca.us/resident/f
rame.htm 
Interactive pin district map linked to 
crime data containing address, call 
type, and date/time. Jan '02-Apr '05.     √   
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Jurisdiction St Web Address Description Of Site Contents Notable 
Sites 
Calls for 
service 
Reported 
Crimes 
Persons 
Fontana CA 
http://www.fontan
a.org/police/crime
_mapping.htm 
Interactive Pin "COMPASS" map with 
locations of calls for service, "crime 
event," and "enforcement activity."  √ √ √   
Fremont CA 
http://www.fremo
ntpolice.org/meg
an/megan.html 
No maps. Only basic crime stat totals 
for '00-'05.     √   
Fresno CA 
http://www.fresno
.gov/fpd/ 
(UPDATED URL)
PDFs with crime statistics and maps 
containing locations of various crime 
types. 2005 data.         
Huntington 
Beach CA 
http://www.hbpd.
org/indexg2.htm 
No maps. Only basic Part 1 crime 
totals for '01-'05.     √   
Los Angeles 
County CA 
http://gismap.co.l
a.ca.us/sols/defa
ult.htm 
Interactive pinmap with sex offender 
releasee info including address and 
offense info. Also contains offender 
location in relation to schools. √     √ 
Oakland CA 
http://www.oaklan
dnet.com/cw/Disc
laimer.jsp  
(UPDATED URL)
Interactive "CRIMESTAT" map with 
locations of crimes. √   √   
Ontario CA 
http://www.ci.onta
rio.ca.us/index.cf
m/2981 
No maps. Only Part 1 crime and 
traffic accident totals from '01-'03.         
Oxnard CA 
http://www.oxnar
dpd.org/CrimeCa
mera/crimemap.h
tm 
Interactive Pinbeat map linked to 
crime data.     √   
Redding CA 
http://rpdmaps.ci.
redding.ca.us/ Same site as Los Angeles County.     √ √ 
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Jurisdiction St Web Address Description Of Site Contents Notable 
Sites 
Calls for 
service 
Reported 
Crimes 
Persons 
Riverside 
County CA 
http://216.57.210.
151/riverside/jsp/i
ndex.jsp Same site as Los Angeles County.     √ √ 
Sacramento CA 
http://gis.cityofsa
cramento.org/We
b site/sacpd/ Interactive pinmap with a query builder. √       
Salinas CA 
http://crimemap.ci
.salinas.ca.us/
Not up-to-date re: stats. Latest available 
are 2004 Part 1, Part 2, Misc, and 
"burglary summary." Site says there is 
an Interactive Pincrime map, but the 
server is always busy.         
San Diego 
County CA 
http://www.arjis.o
rg/mapping/help/
disclaimer.html
Interactive Pinmap with locations of 
crimes and linked data on crime time 
and block address.         
San Diego 
County CA 
http://www.arjis.o
rg/SDCRPinMap
Entry.html Same site as Los Angeles County.     √ √ 
Santa Rosa CA 
http://ci.santa-
rosa.ca.us/pd/29
0pc/index.html
Linked to Megan's Law Web site (same 
as others). No other crime stats 
anywhere.     √ √ 
Visalia CA 
http://www.vpd.ci.
visalia.ca.us/ 
Interactive pinmap with crime incident 
location linked to offense info and date. 
Up-to-date. Site also has Part 1 crime 
stats for '03-'05 and "tracking trends for 
COPPS" stats. √   √   
Boulder CO 
http://www.ci.boul
der.co.us/police/c
rime/crime_map_
flash.htm 
Interactive pinmap with current week’s 
crime incident locations. Also has map 
of districts. √   √   
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Jurisdiction St Web Address Description Of Site Contents Notable 
Sites 
Calls for 
service 
Reported 
Crimes 
Persons 
Colorado 
Springs CO 
http://www.springsgo
v.com/Page.asp?Nav
ID=348 
PDF maps of burglaries (motor vehicle), 
burglaries, MV theft, robberies, and 
vandalism locations, by week since 
beginning of '06. Also has .asp map of 
meth lab seizures to date for '03-'05.     √   
Golden CO 
http://ci.golden.co.us/
dept/police/crimemap
/crimemaps.htm 
No crime stats or crime maps. City Web 
site has GIS link, but no crime maps 
available.         
Longmont CO 
http://www.ci.longmo
nt.co.us/police/crimeu
pdate/map.htm 
Semi-interactive pinsite with assault, 
burglary, car break-ins, motor vehicle 
thefts, mischief/vandalism, and sexual 
assault incident locations. Also has Part 
1 crime stat totals for '01-'05.     √   
Washington DC 
http://mpdc.dc.gov/inf
o/districts/districts.sht
m
Citywide up-to-date monthly crime stats 
and static maps of district and defined 
district "hot spot areas     √   
Fort 
Lauderdale FL 
http://ci.ftlaud.fl.us/pol
ice/mapflpd.html 
Graphic map of districts. Citywide 
Violent and Non-Violent Crime stats '00-
'05, Part 1 crime data, arrests, and 
service calls; all up-to-date.   √ √   
Port St. 
Lucie FL 
http://www.cityofpsl.c
om/PSLCops/index.ht
m
Interactive map of districts and zones. 
Site also contains basic crime stats by 
district.     √   
Atlanta GA 
http://www.atlantapd.
org/index.asp?nav=cr
imemaps 
Interactive pinmap with basic crime 
incident locations and Interactive 
Pindistrict map linked to commander 
and contact info. Also has UCR report 
for '02-'05. √   √   
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Jurisdiction St Web Address Description Of Site Contents Notable 
Sites 
Calls for 
service 
Reported 
Crimes 
Persons 
Chicago IL http://12.17.79.6/ 
Interactive pinmap with crime incident 
location linked to crime classification. Up-
to-date. Also has an Interactive pin "safe 
passage program map" for safe routes to 
schools.  √       
Illinois State 
Police IL 
http://samnet.isp.
state.il.us/statepo
lice/images/sami
ntro.htm 
Detailed up-to-date sexual offender 
database with offender locations and 
offense info. UCR data from 1997-2004. 
No maps.     √ √ 
Evansville IN 
http://www.evans
villepolice.com/cri
me_analysis.htm 
Interactive pinmap of crime incident 
locations linked to crime description and 
date/time of incident. Up-to-date. √       
Indianapolis IN 
http://arcimsnt1.in
dygov.org/prod/in
cident/ 
Interactive pinmap of crime incident 
locations linked to description, incident 
address, date/time, and case #. Also has 
Interactive Pin"crime view community" 
map that seems to have similar data, but 
in relation to schools, etc. and is better 
quality. √       
Lenexa KS 
http://65.70.140.1
07/Web 
site/lencrime/inde
x.html# 
Interactive pinmap of crime incident 
locations linked to date of incident. Up-to-
date.         
Wichita KS 
http://www.wichit
apolice.com/Ther
matic_Maps/stats
.htm 
Semi-interactive map of "reporting areas" 
linked to crime stat totals. Also has JPG 
thematic maps of various crimes.   √ √   
Lexington KY 
http://crimewatch.
lfucg.com/
Interactive pinmap with locations of 
crimes but no linked data.         
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Jurisdiction St Web Address Description Of Site Contents Notable 
Sites 
Calls for 
service 
Reported 
Crimes 
Persons 
Jefferson 
Parish LA 
http://www.jpso.c
om/mo_ims/jpso_
web/zipcode_star
t.htm 
Interactive pinmap with locations of 
crime incidents linked to address, 
time/date. Shows surrounding 
schools and parks.         
New Orleans LA 
http://www.new-
orleans.la.us/cno
web/nopd/maps/b
asecrimemap.ht
ml Not currently available.         
Cambridge MA 
http://www.ci.cam
bridge.ma.us/~C
PD/reports/2003/f
irst%20quarter%
20report/index.ht
ml 
Semi-interactive department map 
linked to PDF '04 reports containing 
maps and other year-end info.          
Danvers MA 
http://www.danve
rspolice.com/anal
ysis.htm 
Contains links to other crime 
analysis pages such as the Crime 
Mapping Research Center at NIJ.          
Baltimore MD 
http://141.157.54.
34/bpdmaps/ 
Interactive pinmap with locations of 
crime incidents linked to address, 
time/date, and crime description. 
Shows surrounding schools, police 
stations, and parks. √   √   
Detroit MI 
http://www.ci.detr
oit.mi.us/police/p
olice/compstat.ht
m 
UCR data from '90-'04 plus some 
charts/graphs of stats.      √   
Lansing MI 
http://www.lansin
gpolice.com/ 
Interactive pinmap with crime 
incident locations.         
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Jurisdiction St Web Address Description Of Site Contents 
Notable 
Sites 
Calls for 
service 
Reported 
Crimes Persons 
St. Louis MO 
http://64.218.68.50/
stlouis/newslmpd/vi
ewer.htm 
Interactive pinmap with locations of 
crime incidents linked to address, 
time/date, and crime description.      √   
Charlotte-
Mecklenburg NC 
http://baffle.pfeiffer.
edu/ 
Interactive pinmap with crime incident 
locations. Shows surrounding schools, 
police stations, and hospitals.   √ √   
Lincoln NE 
http://ims.ci.lincoln.
ne.us/CVCommunit
y/ 
"Crime View Community" map, 
interactive, with locations of crime 
incidents linked to time/date and crime 
description.  √   √   
Albuquerque NM 
http://www.cabq.go
v/police/statistics/in
dex.html (Updated 
URL) 
Neighborhood and beat crime stats 
only. No maps.     √   
Hobbs NM 
http://www.hobbspd
.com/crimestats.ht
m (Updated URL) 
Graphic maps of auto burglary, 
commercial burglary, residential 
burglary, and traffic accidents. Also has 
current crime stats including types of 
force used.     √   
Cincinnati OH 
http://www.cincinna
ti-oh.gov/pages/-
282-/ 
PDF report contains hot spot maps. Site 
contains elaborate up-to-date Part 1 & 2 
offense stats.   √ √   
Columbus OH 
http://www.columbu
spolice.org/precinct
stats/ No crime stats.         
Oklahoma 
City OK 
http://www3.kwtv.c
om/television/ 
Interactive pinmap with crime incident 
locations linked to address info. Uses 
ESRI map objects.         
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Jurisdiction St Web Address Description Of Site Contents 
Notable 
Sites 
Calls for 
service 
Reported 
Crimes Persons 
Tulsa OK 
http://www.tulsapoli
ce.org/mapcentral.
html 
Interactive pinmaps with locations of 
crime incidents linked to address, 
time/date, and crime description. 
Separate maps for current crime, '04 & 
'05 crime, meth lab locations, traffic 
collisions, and sex offenders. √   √   
Beaverton 
Police OR 
http://www.ci.beave
rton.or.us/departme
nts/police/crime/#m
aps 
PDF crime maps by district with incident 
locations. Also has PDF version of crime 
stats by district.     √   
Portland OR 
http://www.cgis.ci.p
ortland.or.us/maps/
police/ 
Density maps of total crime summary for 
year and semi-interactive pinmaps with 
incident locations.      √   
Pennsylvania 
State Police PA 
http://ucrreport.psp.
state.pa.us/UCR/R
eporting/GIS/GisMa
in.asp 
Density maps of total crime summary for 
year and semi-interactive pinmaps with 
incident locations.          
Memphis TN 
https://crimemappe
r.memphispolice.or
g/crimemapper/ind
ex.cfm
Density maps containing total offenses, 
total offense per 10,000 pop, total 
offense/law enforcement officers, and law 
enforcement staff per 10,000.         
Nashville TN 
http://www.police.n
ashville.org/stats/m
aps/sectors.htm 
Interactive, up-to-date crime pinmap and 
UCR stats      √   
Austin TX 
http://www.ci.austin
.tx.us/police/crimein
formation
Interactive map linked to crime counts. 
Does not have incident locations mapped.         
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Jurisdiction St Web Address Description Of Site Contents 
Notable 
Sites 
Calls for 
service 
Reported 
Crimes Persons 
Dallas TX 
http://www.ci.dallas.tx
.us/dpd/stat_decision.
htm 
Interactive beat map linked to 
beat's crime data.     √   
San Antonio TX 
http://maps.sanantoni
o.gov/Web 
site/sapducr/viewer.a
sp
SAPD Uniform Crime Report Web 
site - interactive pinmap with 
crime incident locations linked to 
incident info.      √   
Salt Lake 
County UT 
http://www.slsheriff.or
g/html/stats/communi
ty_stats.html
Graphic map with quarterly or 
monthly crime stats and incident 
locations.         
Stafford 
County VA 
http://www.co.stafford
.va.us/sheriff/map.ht
m No crime stats or map         
Pierce 
County WA 
http://www.co.pierce.
wa.us/pc/abtus/ouror
g/sheriff/default.htm 
Interactive pinmap of incident 
locations with  links to stats w/in a 
certain radius of the area. √       
Snohomish 
County WA 
http://gis.co.snohomis
h.wa.us/maps/rso/ind
ex.htm 
Interactive pinmap with sex 
offender releasee locations linked 
to detailed offender info.       √ 
Spokane WA 
http://www.spokanep
olice.org/weeklymap.
htm 
Interactive pinmap with incident 
locations linked to a crime 
summary. √       
Philadelphia 
PD PA 
www.cml.upenn.edu/
crimebase
Interactive density maps linked to 
crime summary data for '98-'04         
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 Reviewed Web Sites - Arizona 
 
 
Jurisdiction  Web Address  Description Of Site Contents  Notable 
Site  
Brochure 
Type Site  
Crime 
Statistics  
Crime 
Maps  
Interactive 
Crime Map  
Online 
Reporting  
Apache County 
Sheriff's Office 
(Saint Johns)  www.apacheone.com  
Static page - no 
crime statistics 
 
√  
    
Apache 
Junction PD  
www.ajcity.net/police/public_safety.
htm  
Static page - no 
crime statistics  √      
Avondale PD  
www.ci.avondale.az.us/index.asp?
NID=7 8  
Monthly crime 
stats in PDFs   √  √     
Bullhead City 
PD  
www.bullheadcity.com/police/index.
asp  
Static page - no 
crime statistics  √      
Carefree Town 
Marshal's 
Office  
www.carefree.org/index.asp?Type=
B_L ST&SEC={5FDB2E4B-6EB4-
44A9-8926CE16F1303FF3}  
Static page - no 
crime statistics 
 
√  
    
Casa Grande 
PD  
www.ci.casagrande.az.us/cgpd/cgp
d.php  
Static page - no 
crime statistics, 
Online Complaint 
and Crime Report 
Forms for 
property crime 
under $250  
 
√  
   
√  
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Jurisdiction  Web Address  Description Of Site 
Contents  
Notable 
Site  
Brochure 
Type Site  
Crime 
Statistics  
Crime 
Maps  
Interactive 
Crime Map 
Online 
Reporting  
Chandler PD  www.chandlerpd.com  
Order Online 
Reports; Several 
Online Forms; 
Corona Solution 
Interactive Map and 
reports on calls for 
service in prior week 
& previous 12 
months - Powered 
by CADMine; Alarms 
data for year  √  
 
√  √  √  √  
Clarkdale PD  
www.clarkdale.az.us/policedept.htm
l  
Static Page - Bike 
Registration Form 
and House Watch 
Form (PDFs)  
 
√  
   
√  
Cochise County 
Sheriff's Office 
(Bisbee)  
http://209.180.126.252/Sheriff/Defa
ult.ht m  Static page - no 
crime statistics 
 
√  
    
Coconino 
County Sheriff's 
Office 
(Flagstaff)  http://co.coconino.az.us/sheriff.aspx Web site down  
      
Cottonwood PD  www.cottonwoodpd.org/frames.htm  
Static Page - Crime 
Stats last updated in 
2002  
 
√  √  
   
Douglas PD  
www.douglasaz.gov/PoliceDepartm
ent/P oliceDepartment.htm  
Static page - no 
crime statistics  √      
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Jurisdiction  Web Address  Description Of Site 
Contents  
Notable 
Site  
Brochure 
Type Site  
Crime 
Statistics  
Crime 
Maps  
Interactive 
Crime Map 
Online 
Reporting  
Eagar PD  
www.eagar.com/public_safety-
police.htm  
Static page with 
police blotter -- list of 
arrests similar to 
newspaper  
 
√  √  
   
Fountain Hills 
Marshal's 
Department  
www.fh.az.gov/PublicSafety/default.
asp  
Link to Maricopa 
County Sheriffs  
      
Gilbert PD  www.ci.gilbert.az.us/police/default.c
fm  
Static pages - 
Graphic maps with 
crime stats  
 √  √  √    
Glendale PD  www.ci.glendale.az.us/police  
Interactive grid map 
-- pulls crime stats 
by month and grid 
area. No GIS 
mapping. UCR 
missing; PDF Crime 
Clock, Forms, 2003 
Performance Report; 
File an online crime 
report on accidents,  √  
 
√  √  
 
√  
Goodyear PD  
http://www.ci.goodyear.az.us/index.
asp? NID=14  
Static page - no 
crime statistics  √      
La Paz County 
Sheriff's Office 
(Parker)  
www.co.la-paz.az.us/sheriff.htm  Static page - no 
crime statistics  √      
Maricopa 
County Sheriff's 
Office 
(Phoenix)  
www.mcso.org/  Static page - no 
crime statistics  √  
    
 
 
70
  
Jurisdiction  Web Address  Description Of Site 
Contents  
Notable 
Site  
Brochure 
Type Site  
Crime 
Statistics  
Crime 
Maps  
Interactive 
Crime Map 
Online 
Reporting  
Mesa PD  www.cityofmesa.org/police/default.
asp  
Large Web site - 
online reporting 
forms; grid maps 
with updated PDFs 
of maps with crimes 
by beat (quarterly - 
Dec 2005); PDFs of 
density maps  
 
 
√  √   √  
Metropolitan 
Area Narcotics 
Trafficking 
Interdiction 
Squads 
(MANTIS) 
(Tucson/Pima)  
www.ci.tucson.az.us/mantis/  Static page with links 
to departments and 
description of drugs  
 
√ 
    
Mohave County 
Sheriff's Office 
(Kingman)  
www.co.mohave.az.us/1moweb/de
pts_fies/sheriff_files/about_sheriff.h
tm  
Static page - no 
crime statistics   √      
Northern 
Arizona 
University PD 
(Flagstaff)  
www.nau.edu/~naupd/  PDF of 2005 Crime 
Report; Online 
Crime Report Form; 
Daily Crime Log  
 
√  
√    √  
Oro Valley PD  www.ovpd.org/  Static Table of 
Incidents and 
Offenses through 
July 05; Static Table 
of Police Activity, i.e. 
calls for service, etc. 
through Feb 06  
 
√  
√     
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Jurisdiction  Web Address  Description Of Site 
Contents  
Notable 
Site  
Brochure 
Type Site  
Crime 
Statistics  
Crime 
Maps  
Interactive 
Crime Map 
Online 
Reporting  
Paradise Valley 
PD  
www.ci.paradise-
valley.az.us/police/  
Static Table Crime 
Stats per month - 
Feb 06; Static Excel 
Crime Graphs  
 
√  
√     
Payson PD  http://www.ci.payson.az.us/Depart
ments/ police/pd-home.htm  
Static page - 2004 
Annual Report in 
PDF  
 √  √     
Peoria PD  http://www.peoriaaz.com/index1.ht
m  
Static Table of Part 1 
Crimes 2005; 
Burglaries by week 
(Mar 15-21' 06), 
PDF; Calls for 
service on 
interactive map -- list 
of calls (2005)  
 
 
√  √  √   
Phoenix PD  www.ci.phoenix.az.us/POLICE/inde
x.htm l  
Crime stats 
interactive - 2002; 
PDF UCR 2005; 
PDF Jan 2006 UCR 
Report; PDFs of 
Hotspot Maps, Sept 
'05  
√  
 
√  √    
Pima 
Community 
College DPS 
(Tucson)  
www.pima.edu/dps/  2004 Annual Report 
- PDF; Monthly Log - 
PDF -Jan 06  
 
√  
√     
Pima County 
Sheriff's Office 
(Tucson)  
www.pimasheriff.org/  Static Tables of UCR 
Crimes by month 
Feb 06  
 √  √     
Pinal County 
Sheriff's Office 
(Florence)  
http://co.pinal.az.us/sheriff/  Static page - no 
crime statistics  √      
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Jurisdiction  Web Address  Description Of Site 
Contents  
Notable 
Site  
Brochure 
Type Site  
Crime 
Statistics  
Crime 
Maps  
Interactive 
Crime Map 
Online 
Reporting  
Prescott PD  http://www.cityofprescott.net/servic
es/pol ce/  
Static Table of UCR 
Crimes through 2005  √  √     
Prescott Valley 
PD  
http://www.pvaz.net/Services/police
/inde x.htm  
Static Table of UCR 
Crimes for Aug' 
2005  
 √  √     
Saint Johns PD  www.stjohnsaz.com/public_safety.h
tm  
Static Table/ Graph 
of 2004 UCR Crime 
Data  
 √  √     
Scottsdale PD  www.ci.scottsdale.az.us/police/  Interactive GIS 
Mapping Application 
using AutoDesk 
Mapping From city 
Web site; Static 
Table UCR 2004; 
Static Table of Auto 
Thefts by Zip & 
Burglaries 2005  
√  
 
√     
Sedona PD  http://www.sedonaaz.gov/egov/dep
artme nt.aspx?dID=357  
Static page - no 
crime statistics  √      
Show Low PD  http://www.ci.showlow.az.us/depart
ments/police/index.htm  
Static page - no 
crime statistics; Few 
online forms - No 
report of crime  
 
√  
   √  
Sierra Vista PD  www.ci.sierravista.az.us/Police/inde
x.htm  
2004 Annual Report 
on Crime Statistics 
(PDF)  
 √  √     
South Tucson 
PD  
www.tucson.com/stpd  2004 Part One GIS 
Crime Maps - Static 
images by quarter  
 √  √     
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Jurisdiction  Web Address  Description Of Site 
Contents  
Notable 
Site  
Brochure 
Type Site  
Crime 
Statistics  
Crime 
Maps  
Interactive 
Crime Map 
Online 
Reporting  
Springerville 
PD  
www.springerville.com/public_safet
ypolice.htm  
Static page - no 
crime statistics  √      
Surprise PD  http://www.surpriseaz.com/index.as
p?N D=22  
Static page - no 
crime statistics  √      
Tempe PD  www.tempe.gov/police/  Online forms for 
some criminal 
activity; Alarms & 
Payment Form; 
Crime Prevention 
Forms; Traffic 
Complaints; 
Extensive Crime 
Analysis Site - 
Updated PDFs; Link 
to 
www.azcentral.com 
crime mapping; Calls 
for service by beat -
interactive and up-
to-date  
√  
 
√  √  √  √  
Tucson PD  http://www.ci.tucson.az.us/police/in
dex.p hp  
Interactive Crime 
Statistics; 2004 
Density Maps of 
Crime PDF; 
Comprehensive site 
- difficulty pulling 
data by 
neighborhoods: 
Online Crime 
Reporting  
√  
 
√  √  √  √  
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Jurisdiction  Web Address  Description Of Site 
Contents  
Notable 
Site  
Brochure 
Type Site  
Crime 
Statistics  
Crime 
Maps  
Interactive 
Crime Map 
Online 
Reporting  
University of 
Arizona PD 
(Tucson)  
www.uapd.arizona.edu/  Static Crime Stats 
Table (2003); Daily 
Activity Log (Mar 
2006); 2005 Annual 
Report (PDF)  
 
√  
√     
Yavapai County 
Sheriff's Office 
(Prescott)  
www.yumacountysheriff.org/index.h
tml  
Static pages - no 
crime statistics; 
County site has 
interactive GIS, but 
no crime  
 
√  
    
Yuma PD  http://www.ci.yuma.az.us/coypd/  Static page - no 
crime statistics  √      
Yuma County 
SO (Yuma)  
http://www.yumacountysheriff.org/  2004 Annual Report 
(PDF); Online Forms 
for Accidents; Report 
Request, etc.  
 
 
√    √  
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